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Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine 
CATHARINE PIERCE WELLS† 
INTRODUCTION  
This Article addresses two distinct issues. The first 
relates to C.C. Langdell, his invention of legal doctrine, and 
his enduring contribution to American law. The second 
relates to legal doctrine generally, seeking a more precise 
understanding of what it is, where it comes from, and the 
role it plays in deciding legal cases.  
There are a number of reasons why Langdell remains 
an important figure in American law. First, he originated 
the case method as a means of legal education;1 second, he 
initiated and inspired the effort to formulate classical 
contract theory;2 and third, he represents to modern readers 
a symbol of legal formalism.3 Indeed, it is this last fact that 
  
† Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1968 Wellesley College; 
M.A. 1973, Ph.D. 1981, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1976, Harvard 
Law School. I am grateful to Dean John Garvey and to the Boston College Law 
School for supporting this research through the Carney Scholars Program. I am 
also grateful to Karen Breda of the Boston College Law Library for her research 
help. This Article was presented at a University of Southern California 
Colloquium, and I am grateful for the comments I received there.  
 1. It was his reforms that that lengthened the law school curriculum to 
three years; that required law students to possess an undergraduate degree; 
and that instituted the case method as the primary form of legal instruction. See 
Bruce A. Kimball, Young Christopher Langdell, 1826-1854: The Formation of an 
Educational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 189 (2002). 
 2. For discussions of classical contract theory, see GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
 3. The case method of legal instruction remains in use today although it is 
much changed from Langdell’s time. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND 
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994); Bruce 
A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They 
Are Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the 
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is responsible for the low regard in which he is held today. 
Contemporary writers have treated Langdell as a straw 
man.4 To him, they have attributed such notions as: 
The law consists of self-evident legal propositions that 
are independent of policy or justice. 
Legal decision making is a simple exercise of 
deductive logic. 
Every case has a uniquely correct outcome.5 
Ironically, this caricature of Langdell has increased his 
importance while at the same time diminishing his 
reputation. Most everyone has come to regard Langdell as 
espousing an overly simplistic and erroneous view of the 
law. Thus, despite the importance of his work, it has 
received relatively little serious attention. There are two 
books about him6 and only a few law review articles.7 Some 
  
Classroom of the Early C. C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57 
(1999); Russell Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 
VILL. L. REV. 517, 518 (1991). 
 4. Posner’s characterization of formalism is typical:  
[Formalism is] the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case 
from premises accepted as authoritative. Formalism enables a 
commentator to pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or 
incorrect, in approximately the same way that the solution to a 
mathematical problem can be pronounced correct or incorrect.  
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986-87). Note 
though that Posner characterizes this view as “related but not identical to the 
‘formalism’ of Langdell and the other nineteenth-century American legal 
formalists.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 5. E.g., M.H. Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to 
Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 96 (1986). 
 6. BRUCE KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION:  
C. C. LANGDELL, 1826-1906 (2009); LAPIANA, supra note 3.  
 7. There are few articles that discuss Langdell’s views beyond a superficial 
level. Of particular interest are Thomas C. Grey’s, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); Bruce A. Kimball’s, Langdell on Contracts and Legal 
Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345 
(2007); Howard Schweber’s, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of the 
Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 421 (1999); and Marcia Speziale’s, Langdell’s Concept of Law as 
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histories have described his contributions to legal education. 
Others have mentioned his legal theories, but there is little 
extended discussion. In short, there has not been much 
interest in the substance of his work.  
In attending to the substance of Langdell’s work, it 
becomes apparent that legal doctrine plays a central role. 
For example, he describes his Summary of the Law of 
Contracts8 (“Summary”) as a “concise statement and 
exposition of the doctrines involved in [the] cases.”9 Here it 
is important to see that Langdell’s use of the term “doctrine” 
is entirely new and original. If one reads both the cases in 
his casebook and his summary thereof, it is apparent that 
what Langdell describes as the “doctrines involved” are 
neither articulated nor expressed by the cases directly. In 
fact, the notion of legal doctrine as something “involved” in 
the cases is at the heart of Langdell’s contribution to 
American jurisprudence. 
The invention of legal doctrine brings us to the second 
focus of this Article. Langdell’s great innovation was the 
formulation of a theory about contracts that could stand as 
the basis for legal decision making. Unlike previous 
theories, this was not a mere summary of the cases. Nor did 
it depend upon another type of normative theory such as 
natural law. Instead Langdell’s doctrine represented a 
freestanding legal theory based upon an analysis of legal 
concepts. Thus, the modern notion of legal doctrine was at 
the center of Langdell’s contribution to American law. It 
was doctrine that Langdell sought to teach by the case 
method; doctrine that formed the substance of his contract 
theory; and doctrine that he believed should be consulted in 
the decision of cases. We have difficulty understanding 
Langdell precisely because of this fact. Modern theorists 
tend to minimize the importance of legal doctrine.10 We do 
not think of it as a freestanding legal theory; rather, we 
think it is a guise for other more practical considerations 
  
Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. 
REV. 1 (1980). 
 8. C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880) 
[hereinafter LANGDELL, SUMMARY]. 
 9. Id. at iv. 
 10. E.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
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such as policy, efficiency, or substantive notions of justice. 
Nevertheless, Langdell’s conception of doctrine remains an 
important part of our legal culture. Like the air we breathe, 
it is essential although it rarely excites our interest. 
Whether we like it or not, we inevitably teach doctrine to 
our students.11 We may teach other things as well; we may 
even teach our students to be skeptical of doctrinal 
arguments. Nevertheless, our students will emerge from our 
classes with a fine-tuned sense about doctrine itself. 
While we underestimate the importance of doctrine, we 
overestimate its simplicity. We think of doctrine as a form of 
legal analysis whose use is so well understood that there is 
no need for methodological analysis. Our views about it are 
casual and unreflective. We think about it as “Black Letter 
Law,” and, just as we acknowledge that commercial outlines 
are inadequate accounts of the law we teach, we think of the 
“Black Letter Law” as an equally inadequate explanation of 
legal decision making. If we talk about doctrine at all, we do 
so in the shadow of many unstated assumptions. What we 
think about doctrine depends upon what we think about the 
nature of legal reasoning, the significance of precedent, or 
the relationship between doctrine and policy. By contrast, 
Langdell utilizes a particular conception of doctrine that 
has both insight and power.  
To explore these issues, I will proceed as follows: 
Part I will examine the state of contract law prior to 
Langdell. This is important because it is difficult to see how 
innovative Langdell truly is unless one can compare his 
theory to what went before.  
Part II will compare the theory of contract formation 
contained in Langdell’s Summary to the law as described by 
the cases in the Casebook. This essentially enables us to 
take Langdell’s course. We, with the students, learn how 
the theory is derived from the cases.  
Part III talks about Langdell’s method. There has been 
a lot of confusion about the nature of Langdell’s enterprise. 
I address this confusion by referring to the text that was   
 11. In each substantive course, students learn some form of doctrine—a 
particular legal language that enables them to make arguments that are both 
well formed and legally relevant.  
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used to teach Langdell and his contemporaries about logic 
and the methodology of science.  
Part IV considers the issue of justification. Part IV.A 
articulates a justificatory argument that Langdell himself 
might have deployed. Part IV.B returns to the contemporary 
non-Langdellian world in order to consider the value of 
doctrine in legal knowledge and legal decision making. 
Doctrine, I argue, is a strategy that mediates between the 
rule of law and a jurisprudence of intuition in individual 
cases. I also argue that a correct understanding of legal 
doctrine clarifies what most lawyers already seem to 
know—that legal doctrine is only one of a number of 
considerations that guide a skillful legal analysis. 
The last part is a conclusion.  
I. PRE-LANGDELL CONTRACT LAW  
Prior to Langdell, there were several influential sources 
of contract law. First and most importantly, there were the 
cases. These will be discussed in the next section. There 
were also the commentaries by Blackstone12 and Kent13 as 
well as Parsons’ treatise on Contract law.14 In this part, I 
describe the content of these materials.  
A.  Blackstone’s Commentaries  
Blackstone’s Commentaries,15 published in 1752, 
represented the first comprehensive survey of English law. 
It quickly became the mainstay of legal education and 
scholarship. At the heart of its influence was its structure.16 
The work was based on a central vision of law as a unified 
subject that could be dissected into logical segments. Thus, 
for example, one part dealt with rights and a second with 
  
 12. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. 
 13. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1827). 
 14. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1864). 
 15. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12. 
 16. While the Commentaries do begin with a discussion of the nature and 
origins of English law, these philosophical reflections were controversial and 
hardly responsible for the continuing influence of the Commentaries. See JAMES 
E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970, at 15 (1990).  
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wrongs.17 These two parts were further subdivided—the 
first into the rights of persons and the rights of property; 
the second into private wrongs and public wrongs. Within 
each of these subdivisions a group of chapters was loosely 
organized around individual legal concepts. This 
organization served a practical purpose. Blackstone had not 
only provided a teaching text; but also, by providing a 
logical structure, he had facilitated legal research. 
Mastering his structure became the key to locating relevant 
legal authority.  
There are two things that are striking about 
Blackstone’s treatment of contracts. First, in Blackstone’s 
scheme, there was no general notion of contractual 
obligation.18 Instead, he presents the field of contract law 
only as an adjunct to a well-developed law of property. 
Contracts are discussed in a chapter called—“Of Title by 
Gift, Grant, and Contract”—which is one of seven chapters 
dealing with questions of title to personal property. 19 This 
chapter appears in the title part of the section on personal 
property, which is a subdivision of the section on property, 
which is a subdivision of the rights of things, which is a 
subdivision of the section dealing with rights. Thus, in 
Blackstone, the concept of contract must be considered an 
extremely marginal category.  
The second thing that is striking about Blackstone’s 
treatment is its extreme generality. The discussion begins 
with a definition: “A contract is an agreement, upon 
sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular 
thing.”20 This definition, in turn, gives rise to a tripartite 
division of the subject: first a discussion of “Agreements”; 
  
 17. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, passim (rights); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 12, passim (wrongs). 
 18. Indeed, it would have been inconsistent with his organization to do so. 
Blackstone treats theories of liability in the section on private wrongs—a section 
that was exclusively devoted to what we would now think of as torts. See 3 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12. 
 19. When Blackstone discusses the different types of contracts, we learn that, 
despite the placement of the contracts discussion into the section on title, some 
common contracts—such as the insurance and debt—have little to do with the 
issue of title as we think of it today. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *460-
70. 
 20.  Id. at *446.  
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second, a discussion of “Consideration”; and third, a 
discussion of the “Thing Agreed to be Done.” Only the first 
two parts deal with contracts generally, and these are 
exceedingly brief.21 Blackstone’s analysis of “the agreement” 
can be summed up as follows: 
An agreement is a mutual bargain made by two 
parties having legal capacity.22 
Such bargains can be express, as when “the terms of 
the agreement are openly uttered and avowed at the time of 
the making.”23  
They can also be implied as when “reason and justice 
dictate.”24  
An agreement can be executed or executory.25 
Similarly, Blackstone does not tell us much about 
consideration. Much of his exposition is taken up with the 
technicalities of the Civil Law doctrine.26 He then briefly 
states that the English doctrine requires consideration but 
does not duplicate the technicalities of the Civil Law. He 
states that “any degree of reciprocity” will preserve the 
validity of the agreements.27 He also reports that certain 
kinds of contracts, notably notes and bonds, require no 
consideration as they have been “authentically proved by 
written documents.”28  
  
 21. The discussion of agreements and consideration take up five pages of the 
thirty-eight that are devoted to contract law. Id. at *442-46. 
 22. Id. at *442.  
 23. Id. at *443. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. The Civil Law, Blackstone states, makes a distinction between good and 
valuable consideration. Under the Civil Law, there are only four permissible 
categories of valuable consideration—money or goods, labor, marriage, or the 
forbearance of litigation. Id. at *444-45. 
 27. Id. at *445. 
 28. Id. at *446. Note that lack of consideration is not a defense for the maker 
of the note but may be for third-party creditors. 
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To a modern reader, Blackstone’s analysis is 
remarkable not for what is included but for what is left out. 
There is no discussion of questions that will assume great 
importance a century later. For example: How do the 
parties make a contract? When is it complete? What is 
meant by the mutuality requirement? Under what 
circumstances would reason and justice require the 
inference of a contract? To understand these omissions, it is 
necessary to consider the commercial context in which 
Blackstone wrote. When Blackstone wrote, the use of 
contracts to order private affairs was mainly limited to four 
particular contexts: 
1. the purchase of goods (Sales); 
2. the entrusting of goods (Bailments); 
3. the lease of goods (Hiring or Borrowing); and 
4. the memorializing of money owed (Debts).29  
Blackstone’s analysis treats each of these areas 
separately. In each case, the legal rules reflect the customs 
surrounding their use. For example, the discussion of sales 
reflects the following rules:  
The vendor has the right to sell his goods to any 
person and on such terms as he pleases.30  
The person who buys the goods cannot take them 
away until he has paid for them.31  
 If a bargain is struck, but both sides walk away, the 
vendor is free to dispose of the goods to someone else.32  
 If, however, any fraction of the price has been paid, 
the vendor must hold the goods for the purchaser.33  
  
 29. These are reflected in the four sections Blackstone uses to describe the 
“thing agreed to be done.” Id. 
 30. Id. at *447. 
 31. Id. This is a default rule. The sales contract can expressly provide 
otherwise. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at *447-48. 
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These represent the customary rules in a market 
situation where all bargaining is face-to-face and the subject 
of the sale is a particular piece of property that can be 
inspected equally by buyer and seller.34 Thus, these simple 
rules are more than sufficient to regulate such issues as 
consideration, description, disclosures, delivery, title, etc.35  
It is in these banal circumstances that we can see the 
true nature of Blackstone’s enterprise. Blackstone saw 
himself as a scientist, whose job was to organize the law. 
While the point of his work was organization, its ongoing 
method was descriptive. Blackstone does not analyze legal 
doctrine, nor does he attempt to theorize it. Instead, he is 
reporting on the traditions and customs of the English 
people as they are assumed and enforced by English courts. 
If the resulting legal rules seem to be general and 
indeterminate, it makes little difference because they are 
supplemented by custom and usage. Certain questions will 
not arise because the parties are acting in accordance with 
norms—both stated and unstated—that have been long 
recognized in a particular context. In such a context there is 
little room for the “law of contracts” as that term is 
understood today. A commercial society that has long-
standing, but relatively simple, commercial practices has 
little need for doctrinal theorizing.36 In such societies, the 
term “contract” does not denote a broad substantive area of 
the law. Instead, as is evident in Blackstone’s writings, it 
names a collection of commercial practices that share only a 
few definitional requirements.  
It is important to see this aspect of Blackstone, because, 
soon after the Commentaries were published, the traditional 
  
 34. More complicated sales transactions require more specific rules. Thus, 
there is a separate discussion that deals with the sale of horses. See id. at *450-
52. 
 35. Of course, warranties remain a problem, but they are specifically dealt 
with in a separate section. See id. at *452. 
 36. And, as the third section shows, to the extent that commercial practices 
had developed in Blackstone’s time, they tended to be governed by a particular 
set of technical rules that arose from the practices themselves. See, for example, 
the discussion of insurance contracts, bills of exchange, and promissory notes. 
Id. at *460-70. 
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contexts began to change.37 This change can be clearly 
observed in Kent’s Commentaries. 
B. Kent’s Commentaries 
Seventy-five years after Blackstone, Kent’s 
Commentaries38 were published in the United States. It was 
the first comprehensive treatment of American law that was 
entirely independent of Blackstone.39 But, while the text 
was original, the structure was not. Contract law, for 
example, was treated as a part of the section on personal 
property40 and, as in Blackstone, the discussion was divided 
into some very brief remarks about contracts in general41 
and a more extensive treatment of the specific types of 
contracts.42 Despite these similarities, there is much that is 
  
 37. We can see this in Blackstone’s discussion of marine insurance where he 
recognizes that “[t]he learning relating to marine insurances [has] of late years 
been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions.” Id. at *461. Having 
stated this, however, he rues the fact that these rules “being founded on 
equitable principles, which chiefly result from the special circumstances of the 
case, [are] not easy to reduce them to any general heads in mere elementary 
institutes.” Id. 
 38. 2 KENT, supra note 13. 
 39. The earliest American treatise was edited by Henry St. George Tucker 
who used Blackstone’s basic text and added annotations detailing the decisions 
of American courts. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, NOTES ON BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS (1826). 
 40. See 2 KENT, supra note 13, at vi-vii. Note though that Kent does not 
rigorously adhere to the structure. For example, see the discussion of sales 
contracts, contained in Part V dealing with personal property, which includes 
cases that relate to the sales of real property. Id. at 367-74.  
 41. Like Blackstone, Kent divides the general law of contracts into three 
sections. Section 1, “Of the different kinds of contracts,” covers much the same 
ground that was covered in Blackstone’s section on the “Agreement of the 
Parties.” Like Blackstone, Kent distinguishes the various types of contracts 
(executory and executed contracts; verbal and written contracts; contracts under 
seal and contract not under seal; and express and implied contracts). Id. at 363-
64. He then outlines the difference between an interest in possession and an 
interest in action. Id. Kent then adds a brief discussion of the fact that contracts 
are governed by the law of the place where they are made. Id. at 364. 
 42. There are eight lectures dealing with the various types of contracts: 
Lecture 39, “Of the Contract of Sale”; Lecture 40, “Of Bailment”; Lecture 41 “Of 
Principal and Agent”; Lecture 43, “Of the Law of Partnership”; Lecture 44, “Of 
Negotiable Paper”; Lecture 47, “Of the Contract of Affreigtment”; Lecture 48, 
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original in Kent’s work. For Kent, contract law is no longer 
a matter of simply recording certain commercial practices. 
He begins his discussion with a few introductory words: 
In entering upon so extensive and so complicated a field of inquiry 
as that concerning contracts, we must necessarily confine our 
attention to a general outline of the subject; and endeavour to 
collect and arrange, in simple and perspicuous order, those great 
fundamental principles which govern the doctrine of contracts, 
and pervade them under all their modifications and variety.43 
Thus, even though Kent joins Blackstone in seeing 
contracts as an adjunct to property law; he nevertheless 
recognizes contracts as a “complicated” field requiring 
“great fundamental principles” arranged in a “simple and 
perspicuous order.” Despite this recognition, however, we 
find in Kent the same abbreviated discussion of the general 
concept of contract. First, there is a section that deals with 
the types of contract. It begins with a general definition of 
contract as “an agreement upon sufficient consideration, to 
do or not to do a particular thing.”44 It then proceeds to 
describe the various kinds of contracts, defining the 
difference between contracts under seal and those not under 
seal, those that are executed and those that are executor, 
and those that are express and those that are implied. The 
second section “explains” consideration. The explanation, 
though, is simply a matter of stating that American courts, 
like English courts, require consideration but reject the 
Civil Law’s technical treatment of the issue.45 Beyond this, 
Kent has little to say except to state the requirement that 
nature of the consideration may not be “repugnant to law, 
or sound policy, or good morals.”46 
  
“Of the Law of Insurance”; and Lecture 49, “Of Maritime Law.” See id. at vii-viii; 
3 KENT, supra note 13, at iv-v. 
 43. 2 KENT, supra note 13, at 363. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Unlike Blackstone, however, he does not treat consideration as a “motive” 
or “cause” of the contract, and instead gives it its modern meaning as something 
that is “either a benefit to the party promising, or some trouble or prejudice to 
the party to whom the promise is made.” Id. at 365 (citing Jones v. 
Ashburnham, (1804) 102 Eng. Rep. 905 (K.B.)). 
 46. Id. at 366. 
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Like Blackstone, the bulk of Kent’s discussion relates to 
the subject matter of various contracts.47 Again, I will take 
as an example the discussion of sales. The length of this 
discussion reflects the fact that, in the decades since 
Blackstone, sales transactions have become more complex.48 
Furthermore, compared to Blackstone, Kent’s analysis is 
decidedly more analytical. Gone are the simple declarative 
sentences, annotated with historical authority. In their 
place, Kent has substituted a critical account of the relevant 
precedents, agreeing with some and disagreeing with 
others. For example, in the context of a discussion of the 
seller’s inability to perform a sales contract, he goes to great 
lengths to show the considerable inconsistencies in the case 
law.49 He also is quick to point out discrepancies between 
what he understands to be “the technical rule” and the 
“[t]he justice of the case.”50 And, finally, he concludes the 
discussion by calling for a more rational approach:  
It is to be regretted, that the embarrassment and contradiction 
which accompany the English and American cases on this subject, 
cannot be relieved by the establishment of some clear and definite 
rule . . . which shall be of controlling influence and universal 
reception.51 
Thus, Kent begins by reciting the need for clear and 
definite rules and ends by recognizing that such rules have 
not been found in the cases.  
The absence of rules has important consequences for the 
theory of contracts. If there are rules, then new cases must 
be decided in accordance with them.52 Without rules, 
  
 47. Lecture 39 deals with sales contracts; Lecture 40 deals with bailments; 
Lecture 41 deals with principals and agents; and Lecture 42 deals with 
maritime law. Id. at vii-viii. 
 48. Under the topic of sales, Kent discusses warranties, disclosures, passing 
title by delivery, the Statute of Frauds, sales affected by fraud, sales at auction, 
and stoppage in transitu. See id.  
 49. See id. at 368-69. 
 50. Id. at 371. 
 51. Id. at 374. 
 52. While rules are not entirely outcome-determinative in their application, 
they represent a particular way of comparing cases. A rule specifies the 
characteristic that makes a case similar to one previously decided. Without a 
rule, one is left to a more general comparison. 
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however, precedent must operate on a case-by-case basis. 
This means that the inquiry in each new case is whether 
the case is so similar to a prior case that the result in the 
prior case must be controlling. This judgment of similarity 
can be very subjective—one person’s “similar” facts are 
“distinguishable” to another. This might leave the court 
with little reason to decide the case one way or another. To 
address this, Kent’s arguments take on a modern cast. 
Similarity, for him, is not simply likeness, but involves two 
other considerations. First, there is the question of 
consistency. Because Kent highlights the underlying 
reasoning that supports a judicial decision, he facilitates 
inquiry into the consistency of this reasoning among a large 
number of cases. Second, there is the question of policy. 
Kent highlights justice and policy as important grounds of 
legal decision making.53 This adds an additional dimension 
to discussions of similarity by allowing the litigants to 
compare not only the facts of the two cases but also the 
policies that are implicated. Cases can be seen as similar 
not just because they invoke similar facts, but also because 
they involve similar considerations of justice and utility. 
Thus, even though Kent does not supply us with an 
articulation of contract doctrine, he provides the beginning 
of an analysis that deepens the discussion of relevant 
precedent. 
C. Parsons’ The Law of Contracts 
The Law of Contracts54 by Parsons was published in 
1855 and occupies a special place in any discussion of 
Langdell’s theory of contract law. Parsons not only taught 
Langdell, but served as a kind of mentor. It was Parsons 
who helped to arrange the Harvard librarianship that 
allowed Langdell to continue his studies.55 From his post in 
the library, Langdell made substantial contributions to 
Parsons’ work on his treatise and these were duly 
acknowledged by the author.56 Thus, we know that Langdell 
was thoroughly familiar with Parsons’ work and that it 
  
 53. See id. at 364, 368. 
 54. PARSONS, supra note 14. 
 55. Langdell held the post from 1852-1854. See Kimball, supra note 1, at 225.  
 56. PARSONS, supra note 14, at xiv. 
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makes sense to regard it as a kind of starting point for 
Langdell’s own thoughts about contract law. 
Parsons’ book is a three-volume work devoted 
exclusively to contracts. Its length indicates the growing 
volume and diversity of commercial activity. It also reflects 
a growing sense that the notion of contract was a central 
rather than a marginal category of American law. In fact, 
Parsons begins his treatise with just this sentiment: 
The Law of Contracts, in its widest extent, may be regarded as 
including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of 
human life. Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of human 
society. All social life presumes it, and rests upon it; for out of 
contracts, express or implied, declared or understood, grow all 
rights, all duties, all obligations, and all law. Almost the whole 
procedure of human life implies, or, rather, is, the continual 
fulfillment of contracts.57 
Note that, in little more than a century, what was 
treated by Blackstone and Kent as a technical device for 
conveying title had become, in Parsons’ hands, the source of 
all, or nearly all, human obligation.  
Parsons’ treatise has a distinctly modern look. In 
Blackstone and Kent, the bulk of the discussion related to 
particular types of contracts and the rules that governed 
each type. In Parsons, less than half of the text is devoted to 
this type of analysis.58 Instead, the text is organized around 
certain contract doctrines which are presumed to apply to 
all types of contracts. This gives the appearance that 
contracts is not only an important aspect of law, but also a 
unified one. However, the presumption of general 
applicability creates a need to note the many exceptions and 
counterexamples for each given category. This means that 
the text becomes more complicated and that clarity must be 
sacrificed to subtlety and particularity. All of this makes 
  
 57. Id. at 3. 
 58. The first volume is divided into three parts: the first deals with the 
parties to a contract, the second with consideration and assent; and the third 
with the subject matter of contracts. The second volume assumes a binding 
contract and considers the various issues that arise in connection with its 
enforcement. Thus, it is only the third section of the first volume that deals with 
individual types of contracts. Id. at xxiii-xxxvi. 
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reading Parsons a frustrating experience as the following 
brief excerpt amply demonstrates: 
A promise is good consideration for a promise. And it is so 
previous to performance and without performance. As if one 
promises to become a partner in a firm, and another promises to 
receive him into the firm, both of these promises are binding, each 
being a sufficient consideration for the other. If one promises to 
teach a certain trade, this is consideration for a promise to remain 
with the party a certain length of time to learn, and serve him 
during that time; but, without such a promise to teach, the 
promise to remain and serve, though it be made in expectation of 
instruction, is void. The reason of this is, that a promise is not a 
good consideration for a promise unless there is an absolute 
mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right at once 
to hold the other to a positive agreement. 
This has been doubted, from the seeming want of mutuality in 
many cases of contract. As where one promises to see another 
paid, if he will sell goods to a third person; or promises to give a 
certain sum if another will deliver up certain documents or 
securities, or if he will forbear a demand, or suspend legal 
proceedings or the like. Here it is said that the party making the 
promise is bound, while the other party is at liberty to do anything 
or nothing. But this is a mistake. The party making the promise is 
bound to nothing until the promisee within a reasonable time 
engages to do, or else does or begins to do, the thing which is the 
condition of the first promise. Until such engagement . . . on the 
part of the promisee which is sufficient to bind him, then the 
promisor is bound also, because there is now a promise for a 
promise, with entire mutuality of obligation . . . But if without any 
promise whatever, the promisee does the thing required, then the 
promisor is bound on another ground. The thing done is itself a 
sufficient and a completed consideration; and the original promise 
to do something, if the other party would do something, is a 
continuing promise until that other party does the thing required 
of him.59  
This passage begins with a clear statement that 
promises will count as consideration, but, as the passage 
continues, it becomes less clear as the matter becomes 
entangled with the issue of mutuality—“a promise is not 
good consideration for a promise unless there is an absolute 
mutuality of engagement.” A reader unfamiliar with 
modern contract doctrine might well conclude that a 
promise will count as consideration only in certain 
  
 59. Id. at 448-51 (footnotes omitted). 
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circumstances, though he might be confused as to exactly 
what those circumstances are.  
Compare the confusion in Parsons’ treatise with the 
relative clarity of Langdell’s treatment twenty years later. 
Langdell treats the issue not as a question of consideration, 
but as part of a newly invented topic of contract formation. 
In addition, he introduces the now familiar distinction 
between unilateral and bilateral contracts as a way of 
clarifying the problem. This is his description: 
Acceptance has hitherto been considered with reference to such 
offers only as contemplate unilateral contracts. When the contract 
is to be bilateral, though the principles are the same, the 
application of them is very different. It still remains true that the 
offer requires an acceptance and the giving of the consideration to 
convert into a binding promise; but as the consideration consists 
of a counter-promise, so the giving of the consideration consists in 
making this counter-promise. It follows also that the original offer 
cannot become a binding promise until the counter-promise also 
becomes valid and binding.60 
In this way, Langdell reconceptualizes the problem with 
the result that it is possible to specify a relatively simple 
rule regarding mutuality of promises: an offer to make a 
promise in exchange for a promise does not become binding 
until the offer is accepted. 
 Conclusion and Summary to Part I 
The progression from Blackstone to Kent, and then on 
to Parsons, represents a certain set of developments in 
contract law. We began with Blackstone and a relatively 
simple exposition of the commercial practices that utilized 
private contracts. The law that governed these practices 
reflected the customs in the market place. Nearly a century 
later, Kent’s treatment is also descriptive, although the 
practices themselves have become more sophisticated. Kent 
sees the need to bring consistency and order to these 
practices, but is unable to attain this ideal within the 
confines of the relevant case law. Parsons, twenty five years 
later, puts together a thorough compendium of contract law, 
but in some ways makes the situation worse. His attempt to 
unify the law of contracts results in confusion and 
  
 60. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 12. 
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inconsistency. It is therefore left to Langdell to restore order 
and simplicity. In the next part, we will consider how he 
accomplishes this. 
II. LANGDELL’S INNOVATION  
Langdell’s work in contract law is contained in two 
separate volumes. The first is a casebook meant to be used 
in his class on contract law (“Casebook”);61 and the second is 
his Summary.62 The Summary was first published as a 
supplement to the Casebook and, only later, published 
independently as a freestanding treatise. What is 
remarkable about the two volumes is that the “law” 
contained in the Casebook is so different from what is 
contained in the Summary. This discrepancy makes it clear 
that Langdell did not use the case method solely to question 
and drill students on what they had already read in the 
cases. Nor did he use class discussions merely to raise 
minor points of clarification or comparison.63 Instead, he 
expected the students—obviously with his help—to learn 
lessons from the cases that were not directly stated in the 
cases themselves. Specifically, Langdell is not teaching the 
theory articulated in the cases. Rather, he is showing that a 
new theory makes better sense of the cases. In order to 
show the nature of Langdell’s theory, it is necessary to 
compare it to the legal theory contained in the cases. I will 
therefore begin by going through a part of the Casebook as a 
student might have done in 1880 (Part II.A). I will then, by 
way of contrast, demonstrate the way in which his theory 
analyzes and decides these same cases (Part II.B). This will 
show that Langdell’s theory, rather than being some 
mechanical compilation, is in fact a creative effort to 
synthesize a complex and confusing area of law.  
I apologize in advance to readers who teach contracts. 
These readers will certainly find the following discussion 
somewhat obvious and pedantic. However, for those of us 
  
 61. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d 
ed. 1879) [hereinafter LANGDELL, CASEBOOK].  
 62. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8. 
 63. Bruce Kimball argues that Langdell’s marginalia suggest the kind of 
technical questions that Langdell addressed to his students. See Kimball, supra 
note 3, at 66-77. 
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who do not teach contracts, the various points require 
elaboration. And for all readers, it is important to 
distinguish Langdell’s actual theory from those that came 
later, and are presumed by modern casebooks.  
A. The Law Expressed in the Casebook 
It seems important to note that Langdell’s Casebook is 
quite different from those in use today. There are no notes 
or commentary. The only organization is that there are 
three sections, and a number of subsections into which the 
cases are divided. I will specifically examine the first section 
of the Casebook which is entitled “Mutual Consent.”64 The 
twenty-five cases in this section are not presented in any 
particular order beyond the obvious fact that: one, there are 
two lines of cases, the first English and the second 
American; and, two, the cases within each line progress 
from the oldest and simplest, to the most recent and most 
complex. In this section of the Article, I will confine my 
comments to the first line of English cases solely to avoid 
length and repetition.  
The first two cases are from the eighteenth century and 
provide a framework for analyzing the problem of contract 
formation. The first, Payne v. Cave,65 is an auction case 
involving the following sequence: (1) the plaintiff put up a 
piece of merchandise; (2) the defendant placed a bid; and, 
(3) the defendant revoked his bid before the hammer fell. 
The court held that there was no contract because the 
auctioneer had not brought down the hammer before the 
revocation was made. The decisive argument on behalf of   
 64. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at xi. This first section is followed by 
two others: “Consideration” and “Conditional Contracts.” The section on 
Consideration is further subdivided as follows: Nature of Consideration; From 
whom the Consideration must move; What Contracts Require a Consideration; 
Sufficiency of Consideration in General; Forbearance; Compromise; Moral 
Consideration; Gratuitous Bailment; Mutual Promises; Consideration Void in 
Part; and Executed Consideration. The section on Conditional Contracts is 
further divided: Conditions Precedent; Independent Covenants and Promises; 
Mutual and Concurrent Conditions; Conditions Subsequent; Performance of 
Conditions, and how it should be averred; Part Performance of Conditions, and 
Effect thereof; Waiver of Performance, and Effect thereof; Contracts Conditional 
Upon Demand; and Contracts Conditional upon Notice. Id. at xi-xiii. 
 65. (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra 
note 61, at 1. 
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the defendant was that there was no mutuality of 
obligation. Before the hammer fell, the court reasoned, the 
seller could have walked away from the sale.66 Since the 
seller had no obligation, he had furnished no consideration, 
and this left the buyer’s agreement to pay without 
consideration as well.  
The second case, Cooke v. Oxley67 involved a similar 
situation. In that case, a merchant offered to sell a certain 
amount of tobacco to the plaintiff. The seller also agreed to 
give the buyer until 4 p.m. to accept his offer. The plaintiff 
did accept the offer before 4 p.m., but the defendant, in the 
meantime, decided not to sell. The court held there was no 
contract. Again, the seller’s promise to wait for an answer 
was without consideration, and could not itself serve as 
consideration for the buyer’s promise to purchase.68  
These two cases seem strange to a modern reader, but 
they are both decided upon a particular principle. I will 
refer to this principle as the “mutuality principle.” The 
mutuality principle follows from the definition of contract as 
an agreement upon sufficient consideration.69 The courts 
understood this as requiring that each party must agree to 
the contract and furnish consideration. If either party failed 
either requirement, then no contract was formed—there 
was simply a nudum pactum that could not be legally 
enforced. These requirements resulted in a number of issues 
about timing. Indeed, the timing issue proved crucial in 
many cases. The reason for this is not hard to see. If there is 
any time between one promise and the other, then, for that 
time, the first promise will not be binding. This means that 
  
 66. “The auctioneer is the agent of the vendor, and the assent of both parties 
is necessary to make the contract binding; and that is signified on the part of 
seller by knocking down the hammer, which was not done here until the 
defendant had retracted.” Payne, 100 Eng. Rep. at 503. This illustrates the 
indecisiveness of the rule about mutuality of obligation. Why is there no 
contract before the hammer came down? Could the seller really have walked 
away? The mutuality rule does not decide this case unless both questions are 
answered in the affirmative.  
 67. (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra 
note 61, at 2. 
 68. Cooke, 100 Eng. Rep. at 786. 
 69. See 2 KENT, supra note 13, at 363 (“An executory contract is an agreement 
upon sufficient consideration to do or not do a particular thing.”).  
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the second promise fails because the original promise, being 
a nudum pactum, does not count as consideration. The only 
way to make a contract, given these requirements, is for 
both parties to make their agreements simultaneously. 
Since true simultaneity is seldom achieved, the courts 
treated the agreements as simultaneous if they were made 
in the course of an ongoing, face-to-face discussion. This 
created a problem for the plaintiff in Cooke, because the 
initial discussion had been terminated when he left to 
consider the defendant’s offer.  
One problem with this result is its potential unfairness. 
Not knowing the law, a buyer will be deceived by the seller’s 
promise of time to consider. An even more serious problem, 
however, arises when the contract is negotiated by mail. 
This is illustrated by Adams v. Lindsell.70 In Adams, the 
defendant wrote to the plaintiff, offering to sell goods at a 
certain price. The letter was misaddressed and arrived 
three days late. When it arrived, the plaintiff accepted by 
return post. In the meantime, the defendant, having not 
heard from the plaintiff, sold the goods to someone else. The 
defendant argued that there was no contract because of the 
mutuality requirement. The court rejected this argument, 
reasoning that if there was no binding contract until 
plaintiff’s answer was received, then  
no contract could ever be completed by the post. For if the 
defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the 
plaintiffs till the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought 
not to be bound till after they had received the notification that 
the defendants had received their answer and assented to it. And 
so it might go on ad infinitum.71 
Thus, the court recognizes the problem that would 
result if it required simultaneity in the context of contracts 
by mail. They therefore developed a fiction to deal with this 
situation. They would treat the offer as being continuously 
reaffirmed so long as the letter is travelling. In this way, 
contracts by letter came to resemble the face-to-face 
situation where simultaneity is presumed from the fact that 
  
 70. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra 
note 61, at 4. 
 71. Adams, 106 Eng. Rep. at 251. 
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the promises take place in the course of the same 
conversation.  
Following Adams are two more cases where 
simultaneity was at issue. Routledge v. Grant72 is another 
case where the defendant-lessor sought to revoke his 
promise before he had received the counter-promise of the 
plaintiff-lessee. The plaintiff argued that the court had 
abandoned the simultaneity principle in Adams. However, 
two members of the court rejected this argument and held 
that there was no valid contract.73 A third relied on alleged 
variances between the two promises to reach the same 
result. 74  
The second case, Head v. Diggon,75 involved similar 
facts. The defendant in Head made an offer to sell and left 
three days for the plaintiff’s response. Whether the 
plaintiff’s response was timely depended on whether 
Sunday was included in the calculation. The court, however, 
ignored the Sunday issue and applied the mutuality 
principle to hold that there was no contract.76  
After Head, it must be taken as clearly established that 
the only exception to the mutuality principle was the mail 
rule developed in Adams. This being so, the result in Hyde 
v. Wrench77 should not surprise us. In Hyde, there was a 
face-to-face price negotiation. The defendant offered to sell 
at 1200 and the plaintiff refused. The defendant then 
offered a sale price of 1000, and the plaintiff countered at 
950. At that point the interview was over, and the 
defendant asked for time to think it over. When they 
  
 72. (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 920 (C.P.D.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, 
supra note 61, at 6. 
 73. Routledge, 130 Eng. Rep. at 922-23. 
 74. One was a seven-day variance related to the time of occupancy; the 
second occurred because although the plaintiff had accepted the offer, he had 
not yet executed a lease that would have given him the legal right to sublet the 
property for the entire period. Id. 
 75. (1828) 3 Man. & R. 97 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra 
note 61, at 10. 
 76. Head, 3 Man & R. at 98-100. 
 77. (1840) 49 Eng. Rep. 132 (L.R.Ch.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, 
supra note 61, at 13. 
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resumed negotiations, the defendant rejected the offer of 
950. When the plaintiff tried to take advantage of the 
earlier offer of 1000, the defendant refused. The court, 
confronted with these facts simply said: 
The Defendant offered to sell it for £1,000, and if that had been at 
once unconditionally accepted, there would undoubtedly have 
been a perfect binding contract; instead of that, the Plaintiff made 
an offer of his own, to purchase the property for £950, and he 
thereby rejected the offer previously made by the Defendant. I 
think that it was not afterwards competent for him to revive the 
proposal of the Defendant . . . and that, therefore, there exists no 
obligation of any sort between the parties. . . .78 
Note that the mutuality principle alone would be 
enough to settle the case, but the court seems to indicate a 
further reason, namely that, once a proposal is rejected, it 
cannot be revived. 
The next case, Williams v. Cardwardine,79 does not 
seem to belong in a set of cases dealing with the mutuality 
principle. In Williams, the defendant offered a reward for 
information leading to the arrest of a murderer. The 
plaintiff, who had been beaten by the murderer, made a 
statement that led to his arrest. The reason for this 
statement was that she “believ[ed] she had not long to live, 
and to ease her conscience[.]”80 When she subsequently 
claimed the reward, the defendant refused, arguing that she 
had provided the information for her own reasons and that 
her action was not intended as consideration.  
The mutuality principle was not relevant to this case.81 
Instead, the question was whether the plaintiff’s actions 
  
 78. Hyde, 49 Eng. Rep. at 133. 
 79. (1833) 110 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra 
note 61, at 12. 
 80. Williams, 110 Eng. Rep. at 590. 
 81. The modern reader, familiar with Langdell’s distinction between 
unilateral and bilateral contracts, has no trouble discerning the reason that 
mutuality is not relevant here. The defendant’s offer was an offer for a 
unilateral contract that could be accepted by performing the act required in the 
offer, namely the provision of information. The offer to reward was never 
revoked. It remained open until the time when the plaintiff did the act that 
completed the contract. From Langdell’s point of view, however, the problem in 
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provided the required consideration given that they were 
not intended as such. The court held that they did, ruling 
that the plaintiff’s motives were irrelevant.82  
The next two cases return to the postal context and 
address the issue of what happens when letters cross in the 
mail. The first case, Potter v. Sanders,83 does not involve a 
contract at all. This case involved the sale of real estate 
where the seller, Sanders, had been negotiating with two 
different parties. The first was the plaintiff, Potter. The 
second was a man named Coates who was negotiating with 
Sanders’ father. The plaintiff sued for specific performance 
alleging that the father had notice of the sale to the plaintiff 
before he completed the second sale.84 While there were 
numerous questions that affected the case, the court chose 
its issue carefully. It said that the issue was one of notice: 
did the father, whose son had written to him the day before 
informing him of the first sale, have notice of the first sale 
absent proof that the letter had actually been received by 
the father prior to the second sale? The court decided that it 
did not matter when the son’s letter had been received, so 
long as the letter had been mailed on the 23rd. It wrote:  
I think the vendor, when he put into the post office the letter to 
the Plaintiff of the 23d of April, did an act which, unless it was 
interrupted in its progress, concluded the contract between 
himself and the Plaintiff. I cannot, in short, doubt but that the 
letter of the 23d was a revocation of the authority which the 
vendor had given to his father to make a contract for him for the 
sale of the estate.85 
  
this case is that the plaintiff’s act should not count as consideration unless she 
intended it as such. 
 82. Williams, 110 Eng. Rep. at 591. 
 83. (1846) 67 Eng. Rep. 1057 (L.R.Ch.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, 
supra note 61, at 15. 
 84. Potter, 67 Eng. Rep. at 1059. The knowledge that the property had been 
sold would have terminated his agency for the son in the sale of the property, 
thereby rendering his subsequent actions null and void. 
 85. Id. at 1061. 
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Thus, it held that, with respect to termination of 
agency, notice given by mail was effective at the time when 
it was mailed, rather than when it was received.86  
Dunlop v. Higgens,87 applies this rule to the contract 
situation, where the plaintiff’s acceptance crossed in the 
mail with the defendant’s revocation. The exact timing was 
as follows: 
The defendant made the offer by mail on January 
28th. 
The plaintiff received the offer on the 30th.  
 It posted the acceptance on the afternoon of the 30th, 
misdating the letter to the 31st. 
The letter was delayed in transit and received on 
February 1st. 
The defendant posted a letter on February 1st 
rescinding the offer. 
Under Adams v. Lindsell,88 the offer was deemed to be 
renewed and continued until the plaintiff had had time to 
reply by return mail. This he did, however, notice of his 
action did not come to the defendant until he received the 
delayed letter on February 1. The court held that this delay 
was irrelevant. “The mailbox rule” permitted the court to 
deem that the contract was complete the moment that the 
letter was placed in the mailbox.89 
Offord v. Davies90 involves a guarantee. In Offord, the 
defendants rescinded their guarantee during the period 
between making the guarantee and plaintiff’s reliance upon 
  
 86. Id. 
 87. (1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 805 (H.L.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra 
note 61, at 21. 
 88. Dunlop, 9 Eng. Rep. at 808. 
 89. Id. at 807-08. 
 90. (1862) 142 Eng. Rep. 1336 (C.P.D.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, 
supra note 61, at 33. 
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it. The court held that the rescission was valid since there 
was no binding contract during this period.91  
This seems a straightforward application of the 
mutuality principle; since the plaintiff had not yet furnished 
consideration, and indeed was not yet bound to furnish it, 
the furnishing of consideration was not simultaneous, and 
therefore the parties had failed to form a contract. Note, 
however, that the application of the simultaneity 
requirement would make it virtually impossible to have a 
binding guarantee in these circumstances. In any case, the 
court declines to find that there was no contract, but rather 
ruled that the guarantor’s agreement could be revoked at 
any time before the other party had relied on the contract.92  
Like Offord, the next three cases involve delays, but, in 
these cases, the delays prove fatal. In the first, Ramsgate V. 
H. v. Montefiore,93 the defendant applied to purchase certain 
shares of stock. The transaction was delayed by the board’s 
failure to act promptly on the application. In In re National 
Savings Bank Association,94 the delay was the result of the 
corporate agent’s failure to transmit the Board’s action in a 
timely fashion. And in Eliason v. Henshaw,95 the seller sent 
the acceptance by mail rather than by giving it to the man 
who delivered the offer as required by the purchaser. In 
each of these cases, the courts upheld revocations of the 
offer made during the period of delay. Thus, we can see that 
the postal rule is a special case. Offers remain open in the 
postal case out of necessity. When, however, there is a delay 
beyond the normal operation of the mail, the offer can be 
rescinded.  
  
 91.  Offord, 142 Eng. Rep. at 1340. 
 92. See id. at 1339-40. 
 93. (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 109, reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, 
at 43. 
 94. (1867) 4 L.R. Ch. 9, reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at 
42. 
 95. 17 U.S. 225, 226-27 (1819) (first of the American cases), reprinted in 
LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at 71. 
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 Summary and Conclusion to Part II.A 
These cases, taken together, suggest the following about 
the topic of mutual consent.   
The operative definition of a contract is: a contract is a 
promise supported by consideration.  
Without consideration, promises are unenforceable, and 
this gives rise to the mutuality principle: one side cannot be 
bound if the other is not. 
Thus, “I will sell you this for ten dollars,” is not an 
enforceable promise since it remains unsupported by 
consideration. There is still no contract if the buyer replies: 
“I will buy it for ten dollars.” This is because the seller’s 
promise is unsupported by consideration and therefore not 
binding, and a non-binding promise cannot count as 
consideration. This gives rise to the simultaneity 
requirement: both parties must become bound at the same 
time.  
The simultaneity requirement creates some difficult 
issues about timing. Courts have resolved these issues as 
follows:  
Two promises are simultaneous if they are made in 
the course of a face-to-face interview. 
Two promises are simultaneous if they are made in 
the regular course of the mail. 
 If the second promise is made in the regular course, it 
completes the contract at the time it is posted (the mail box 
rule). 
B. The Theory Contained in the Summary 
Langdell’s theory does not consist of the rules outlined 
above. Indeed, the point of the theory is to provide an 
explanation of the cases while, at the same time, resolving 
some of the inconsistencies and irrationalities. One of the 
chief problems with the pre-Langdell theory is that, without 
more, a promise on one side: “I will sell you this for ten 
dollars” coupled with a promise on the other: “Fine, I will 
pay ten dollars” does not result in a contract unless the 
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parties are face to face or make their contract through the 
mails.  
One solution to this problem would be to eliminate the 
requirement of consideration. This is obviously a radical 
solution that would thoroughly change the law of 
contracts.96 Langdell’s solution, however, leaves the law of 
consideration intact, but instead modifies the requirements 
for contract formation by introducing two new terms: offer 
and acceptance. Langdell begins by referring to the Roman 
rule that a promise is not a legal promise until it has been 
accepted by the promisee.97 Prior to that, it is only an offer. 
For example, if A promises to meet B at ten, A has made an 
offer that can only be converted to a legal promise by B’s act 
of acceptance. Thus, if a contract is a legal promise 
supported by consideration every contract will require three 
elements: 
1. an offer; 
2. an acceptance; and 
3. consideration.98 
It is important to note that the terms “offer” and 
“acceptance” are technical terms, each having their own 
particular properties. 
1. Offer. An offer references two promises. One promise, 
the proposal, is actually made in the offer—the offeror 
promises that a specific promise will be forthcoming if the 
offeree makes his acceptance. The second is the counter-
promise that will not be made until acceptance is made.99 It 
is the second promise that gives rise to the contractual   
 96. Langdell is reluctant to consider altering the rules with respect to 
consideration. For example, in a passage where he examines the possibility of 
eliminating consideration with respect to bills of exchange and insurance 
policies, he writes, “[i]t can easily be shown, however, that this opinion is 
irreconcilable with the nature of these contracts, even when judged by our law, 
still more when judged by the custom of merchants, and that the decisions by 
which it is supported, if they cannot be pronounced erroneous, must at least be 
deemed anomalous.” LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 63. 
 97. Id. at l. 
 98. See id. at 1-5 (discussing the process of contract formation). 
 99. Id. at 14.  
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obligation, but only if it, the second promise, is supported by 
consideration from the other party.  
An offer is a promise to make a promise. The offer can be 
in words or signs and must be communicated to the offeree.100  
So defined, the concept of an offer allows Langdell, to 
introduce a radically new idea: the proposal in the offer, i.e., 
the promise to make a promise, is binding without 
consideration so long as the offer remains open. Langdell’s 
analysis therefore makes an important distinction between 
offers and promises; with offers, a promise to make a 
promise is binding once it is accepted by the offeree; with 
promises, a promise is not binding until it is supported by 
consideration. In these circumstances, the consideration 
requirement applies only to the second promise, i.e. the one 
that is promised in the offer. If the second promise is 
without consideration, then it will not be binding.  
If a plaintiff who makes an offer is bound thereby, it is 
important to know when an offer expires. Under Langdell’s 
theory,  
An offer remains open until one of the following three 
things happens:  
1. It is rejected by the other party;101  
2. It expires in accordance with its terms;102 or  
3. It is revoked.103 
The fact that proposals are binding in accordance with 
their own terms has consequences for the cases described in 
  
 100. This summarizes Langdell’s description of a bilateral offer. See id.  
 101. Id. at 22-23. 
 102. Id. at 198. If an offer specifies its duration, then its expiration date is 
stated in the offer. If it does not, then the following presumptions apply: 
1. If the offer is made in a face to face interview, it expires at the end 
of the interview. Id. 
2. If the offer is made by mail, it expresses a willingness to receive the 
acceptance in the same way. Id. 
3. With respect to time, there is no general rule. The issue of 
reasonable time is for the jury. Id. at 201. 
 103. Id. at 204, 240. 
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the Casebook. For example, consider the situations 
described in Cooke, Routledge, Head, and Hyde. Using 
Langdell’s analysis, each of these cases involves an offer 
that was binding until one of the above three things 
happens. In Cooke, none of these had happened and so the 
contract would be valid. In Routledge, if the variances were 
fatal, then the offer had been revoked before any acceptance 
became valid. In Head, the issue would be whether the offer 
had expired. And, finally, in Hyde, the offer was closed 
because the offeree had rejected it.  
The notion of a binding offer also provides a different 
result in auction cases such as Payne. Langdell notes the 
confusion that the Payne rule can cause at an auction by 
permitting uncertainty to attach to stated bids. He also 
notes that there is no way for sellers to eliminate the rule 
by contract since whatever effort they make to impose a 
different rule will fall afoul of the mutuality principle. On 
the other hand, Langdell’s theory disposes of the problem 
with clarity. He suggests that a seller who puts up a good 
for auction is making a legal offer to sell the item to the 
highest bidder. As an offer, the promise (I will sell to the 
highest bidder) is binding unless revoked. Therefore the 
sale is completed when the highest bid is made. There is no 
need to wait for the hammer to drop.104 
In addition to distinguishing between an offer and an 
acceptance, Langdell also makes a distinction between 
bilateral and unilateral offers.105 A bilateral contract is a 
two-sided contract—each side makes a promise in exchange 
for the other side’s promise.106 A unilateral contract consists 
of a promise on one side and an action on the other.107 Every 
offer therefore is either an offer to make a unilateral 
contract, or an offer to make a bilateral contract.  
An example of an offer to make a bilateral contract is: I 
promise to pay you ten dollars if you will promise to clean 
your room.    
 104. Id. at 24-25 (comparing actual practice to holding in Payne v. Cave, (1789) 
100 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B.)). 
 105. I believe it is Langdell who originates this distinction as there is no 
mention of these in Kent, Blackstone, or Parsons. 
 106. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 249. 
 107. Id. 
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An example of an offer to make a unilateral contract is: 
I promise to pay you ten dollars if you clean your room.  
In the first case, the offeror has indicated that the offer 
can be accepted by making a promise. In the second, he or 
she has indicated that the offer can only be accepted by the 
offeree’s act of cleaning his or her room.  
The offer in Offord must be understood as a unilateral 
offer. The defendant offeror promises to guarantee certain 
bills of exchange for a period of twelve months. The act 
sought was that the plaintiff would discount the bills at the 
plaintiff’s request. Since the defendant revoked its 
guarantee before any bills had been discounted, no valid 
contract had been formed. The contract could not be binding 
until the plaintiff had accepted the contract by doing the 
required act.  
2. Acceptance. In Langdell’s theory, acceptances are 
different from offers in a variety of ways. First, the proper 
form of an acceptance is stipulated in the offer. For 
example, it is the offeror who determines when the 
acceptance must be made and how it must be 
communicated. It is also the offeror who determines 
whether the contract will be unilateral or bilateral by 
stating whether the offer may be accepted by an act or by a 
promise.108  
Acceptance—An offer is accepted by performing the act 
or making the promise required in the offer.109 
In addition, the acceptance contains not just an explicit 
acceptance of the original offer, but also an implied counter-
offer. The counter-offer proposes the same contract as the 
original offer and it is accepted by the acceptance that was 
implied in the original offer. Thus, each contract represents 
two sets of offer and acceptance: (1) the explicit offer made 
in the original offer with the explicit acceptance contained 
in the acceptance; and (2) the implied counter-offer made in 
the acceptance with the implied acceptance made in the 
original offer.110  
  
 108. See id. at 12. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 14. 
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There is an asymmetry between offers and acceptances. 
An offer is not considered made until it is communicated to 
the offeree, whereas an acceptance is complete upon the 
mental act of the offeree. This does not mean, however, that 
notice of an acceptance is irrelevant. First it is the offeree’s 
responsibility to give notice of the acceptance within a 
reasonable time. Second, there is the additional concern 
that every acceptance contains an implied offer. It is this 
implied offer which, when accepted by the original offeror, 
creates a binding promise for the original offeree, and 
without this binding promise there is no consideration for 
the contract. Because the acceptance contains an implied 
counter-offer, it must be communicated to the original 
offeree before any contract is formed. Thus, there is no 
contract until the acceptance that implicitly contains the 
counteroffer is received by the original offeror. This means 
that despite the fact that acceptances need not be 
communicated in order to be effective, the implicit counter-
offer contained in the acceptance must be communicated.111  
Certainly all of this seems convoluted, and one might 
well ask: what is the point of including the implied counter-
offer and acceptance? The answer is this. Langdell’s 
formulation does two very desirable things. First, it 
provides that there is no contract until both parties have 
committed themselves and informed the other of their 
commitment. Second, it avoids the inevitable regress noted 
in Adams v. Lindsell. Once there is an exchange of letters, 
the contract has been formed. The first party has made an 
offer and has received an acceptance. The second party has 
made an offer (implied in his acceptance) and received an 
acceptance from the first party (implied in his offer). Thus, 
at that point there are two promises, each supported by the 
consideration provided in the other. There is no need for 
further communication. 
3. Consideration. In addition to an acceptance, the 
offeree must provide consideration. In the case of a bilateral 
offer, the consideration will be another promise. In the case 
of a unilateral offer, it will be an act.112 In many cases, the 
  
 111. See id. at 15. 
 112. And further, the act must be complete to count as consideration. This 
means, in an example familiar to first-year contracts students, that an offeror 
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acceptance and the consideration will be the same act. For 
example, if A makes an offer to pay B for going to the store 
(an offer to make a unilateral contract), B’s trip to the store 
will count as both the acceptance of A’s promise and 
consideration for it. In other cases, however, one could have 
consideration without acceptance. For example, B might 
respond to the offer by deciding to go to the store as a favor 
to A. In this case, B’s intention is fatal to the formation of 
any contract. Acceptance and consideration must be 
intended as such, and this requirement has an impact on 
the reward cases such as Williams. Since the plaintiff in 
Williams had her own reasons for giving the desired 
information and was, in fact, ignorant of the reward for 
doing so, his information could not count as an acceptance 
or as consideration and there was therefore no contract 
upon which he could recover. This means that Langdell’s 
theory is at odds with the result in Williams. 
4. Bilateral Contracts by Mail. Just as the mail cases 
caused a problem for the simultaneity principle, they also 
cause a problem for Langdell’s theory. In a simple case, 
there is not much of a problem. If A mails an offer to B, 
expecting a reply by return mail, then A’s letter is an offer 
and the acceptance takes place as soon as B decides to 
accept. Return mail provides reasonable notice of 
acceptance. In Langdell’s theory, there is no need for a 
fiction that the offer was remade continuously until 
acceptance. So long as the offeror does not revoke the offer, 
there is no problem. The difficulty rises when the offeror 
decides to revoke during the period when the letters are in 
transit.  
In order to analyze such cases, it is necessary to review 
the requirements for a contract. In the case of a bilateral 
contract, each side must provide consideration and 
consideration will be in the form of a promise. Each promise 
requires an offer, an acceptance and consideration. Thus, an 
offeror must not only make his offer; he must also accept 
whatever promise is made by the offeree. Similarly for the 
offeree, he must not only accept the offeror’s offer, but he 
must also make an offer of his own. Consider then the 
problem posed by the mailbox situation. The mailbox 
situation is represented in the following chart: 
  
who has promised to reward someone for climbing a flagpole can revoke at any 
time before the offeree reaches the top.  
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Time Party A, Initial Offeror 
Party B, Initial 
Offeree 
T1 
 
I promise to pay you 
if you will promise to 
do X. 
I accept your promise 
to do X if such a 
promise is 
forthcoming. 
(Implied)  
T2 
 
I accept your 
promise to pay me. 
I promise to do X. 
(Implied) 
T3 
A revokes his original 
offer and implied 
acceptance.  
T4 
B’s acceptance and 
implied offer arrives 
in A’s mailbox.  
 
At T3, the acceptance of A’s promise is complete, but B’s 
counter-offer has not been communicated. There is therefore 
no second promise and no consideration. As a result, A’s 
revocation anytime before T4 will be effective to block 
formation of a contract. 
This result denies the so-called “mailbox rule,” and, as 
Langdell acknowledges, is quite controversial.113 It is at this 
point that he makes the statement about justice and 
convenience that was so notably criticized by Holmes: “The 
true answer to this argument[,]” (i.e., that justice and 
convenience require the mailbox rule) “is that it is 
irrelevant.”114 But, having said that it is irrelevant, Holmes 
goes on to pursue the argument with some vigor, offering 
  
 113. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 18-22. 
 114. Oliver W. Holmes, Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880). 
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two separate arguments: (1) the mailbox rule results in a 
more substantial harm to the parties; and (2) rejection of 
the mailbox rule facilitates prevention of the difficulty.115 
However one feels about the mailbox rule, I take my 
point as amply proven. The theory that Langdell articulates 
in the Summary can be found nowhere in the cases. What 
he has done, in offering his theory, is to tell a larger story, 
and, given that no trace of the story can be found in the 
cases, it must be regarded as solely his creation. To tell the 
story, he has had to make up a technical vocabulary that, 
while not as precisely defined as a mathematical formula, is 
at least more definite than the mutuality principle and the 
simultaneity requirement. Since so much of Langdell’s 
theory is not found in the cases, one might reasonably ask: 
why should anyone suppose that Langdell’s theory is true? 
If it is not a description of how courts actually think, why 
should anyone accept it as a theory of legal decision 
making?  
This brings us to the question of justification. However, 
the difficulty in thinking about the justification for 
Langdell’s theory is that he, himself, does not address the 
issue. In fact, given that his theory represents a significant 
innovation in American law, it is odd that he should be so 
reticent about offering reasons to embrace it. He explains 
some of the considerations that led him to use it as a 
teaching method. He has also provided arguments that 
favor certain results in particular cases. But nowhere does 
he offer reasons to embrace the theory itself. For this 
reason, the issue of justification requires a bit of a detour. 
Langdell wrote in the late nineteenth century and, 
fortunately, there are a number of sources that will help us 
understand the notion of scientific method utilized by his 
contemporaries. In the next part, I will examine these 
materials and argue that one of the methods they describe 
is, in fact, the method Langdell was using. This will permit 
us, in the following part, to think about the problem of 
justification.  
  
 115. Id. 
2010] LANGDELL AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 585 
III. LANGDELL’S METHOD  
Langdell was emphatic in describing his work as legal 
science.116 As science, Langdell insisted that our approach to 
law should be both rigorous and systematic.117 An 
understanding of Langdell’s theories, however, requires 
more than just some vague notion of what is logical and 
scientific. In the nineteenth century, science was not a 
precise concept.118 The term “science” could be applied to a 
number of strikingly different methodologies. For example, 
it was used to describe the classificatory systems of biology 
and zoology as well as the predictive methods of physics and 
chemistry. It could also used to describe mathematics, even 
though its method was not generally understood as 
empirical.119 In addition, there were a number of ideas about 
how science could be applied to law. One such idea, of 
course, was that exemplified by Blackstone whose 
“scientific” method was solely a matter of organization.120 
Another is illustrated by Holmes’ Common Law121 which 
traces legal doctrines to their common law origins. Given 
these variations, it is necessary to be specific about the type 
of method Langdell used.  
One way to understand Langdell’s method is to look at 
the standard logical text that was used in his time. 
Understanding what Langdell was taught about science is a   
 116. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at vi-vii. This description may have 
been partly political since, during Langdell’s time, the term “legal science” was 
the rallying cry for those who wished to move legal education out of the 
practitioner’s offices and into university libraries. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Langdell’s interest in legal science was more than just political.  
 117. Id. 
 118. A general account of the method did not emerge until the twentieth 
century when the logical positivists provided a rigorous analysis. E.g., KARL 
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1935). While later philosophers of 
science would quarrel with this account, the account itself remained the center 
of discussion.  
 119. John Stuart Mill famously suggested that mathematics might be 
empirical. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 147-72 (1906). 
Thomas Grey adopted this suggestion, when he argued that Langdell’s method 
was, in fact, inspired by geometry, but by Mill’s empirical account. See Grey, 
supra note 7, at 19.  
 120. See supra Part I.A. 
 121. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
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good start towards understanding his use of a scientific 
method. Thus in the first section, I will examine this text as 
a guide to understanding Langdell’s own outlook on method 
(Part III.A). I will then consider the common view that 
Langdell’s theory is based on a logical system such as the 
one used by geometry, concluding that this view is mistaken 
(Part III.B). In the third section (Part III.C), I will consider 
the possibility that Langdell’s work should be analogized to 
the classificatory systems used by botany and zoology. I will 
argue that this approach is incorrect because it overlooks 
the fact that Langdell’s theory is normative as well as 
descriptive. And finally, after rejecting both the 
demonstrative and classificatory descriptions of Langdell’s 
theory, I argue that it is synthetic in the sense that it 
should be understood as utilizing the predictive model of 
empirical science (Part III.D). 
A. Langdell’s Logic Book 
During the nineteenth century, logic was a required 
course for undergraduates at Harvard.122 The course used a 
series of books that began with Brattle’s Compendium of 
Logick in 1687.123 When Langdell studied logic, the book in 
use was Elements of Logick; or a Summary of the General 
Principles and Different Modes of Reasoning, by Levi 
Hedge.124 Hedge’s book was not limited to symbolic logic.   
 122. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD 1636-1936, at 
235 (1964). Langdell went to Phillips Exeter and may have taken the course 
there. In any case, the course at Exeter used the same book, Hedge’s Logick, 
that was used at Harvard. See Letter from Shelley C. Bronk, Achieves Assistant 
at Phillips Exeter Academy, to Sharon Fry (July 23, 2004) (on file with the 
Buffalo Law Review).  
 123. See 1 ELIZABETH FLOWER & MURRAY G. MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 367 (1977). Brattle’s book was used at Harvard from its 
publication until 1865 when it was followed by Isaac Watts’ LOGIC; OR THE RIGHT 
USE OF REASON IN THE INQUIRY AFTER TRUTH (1825). Watts’ book was in use until 
1827 when Hedge’s book was published. Nor was Hedge’s book the last in the 
series. During Langdell’s time, Francis Bowen and his student Charles Peirce 
were at work on a new text Treatise on Logic, published in 1864. Id. at 382-87; 
FRANCIS BOWEN, A TREATISE ON LOGIC (10th ed. 1890).  
 124. LEVI HEDGE, ELEMENTS OF LOGICK; OR A SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AND DIFFERENT MODES OF REASONING (1816); see FLOWER & 
MURPHEY, supra note 123, at 373 (describing the history surrounding the use of 
Hedges’ book). The course at Phillips Exeter used the same book as was used at 
Harvard. See Letter from Shelley C. Bronk, supra note 122.  
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Instead, it resembled what we would now call practical 
reasoning or critical thinking. The logic course was taught 
in the hope that Harvard graduates would internalize these 
methods and one can see the success of this effort in the 
writings of those they trained.125 Indeed, Hedge’s logic forms 
a kind of rule book for mid-nineteenth century inquiry and 
debate.  
There are two ways in which Hedge’s account of 
scientific method differs from modern accounts. The first 
has to do with what Hedge describes as the involuntary 
operations of the mind. There are two of these.126 The first is 
the power to perceive the external world through the five 
senses. The resulting perceptions are similar to what the 
British empiricists called sense impressions. The second is 
the power of introspection by which each person knows his 
own internal emotional states. In both cases, the processes 
are not subject to conscious control.127 This characteristic is 
important. The things in consciousness that we do not 
control are “reality”; that is, they are the very beliefs that 
science and logic are meant to explain.128  
  
 125. One familiar with the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes or Charles 
Peirce will recognize the influence of the book on their thinking.  
 126. Hedge calls the first operation perception and the second consciousness. 
HEDGE, supra note 124, at 15-20. 
 127. Id. at 19. The incorrigibility of sense impressions is a common claim in 
epistemology. Less common is the claim that the results of introspection are 
similarly incorrigible, although you do find this claim made by philosophers 
such as Descartes. Incorrigibility does not mean that I cannot be mistaken 
about what is in the world or in consciousness, but simply that I am not 
mistaken in reporting what I see. For example, while I cannot be incorrect in 
reporting truthfully that I see a red balloon; I can still be convinced that the 
balloon is not red if I am told that I am observing it through a red filter.  
 128. The reliability of internal states is much more controversial than the 
reliability of perception, but it must be understood in the same way. It does not 
mean that I cannot be mistaken in knowing that I am angry though I can admit 
that I might not be if I knew all the facts. It is important to see how differently 
we think about the emotional realm today. The account in Hedge presumes that 
our emotional states are transparent; that at any given time we will know what 
we are feeling. Id. at 20. This presupposition is just the opposite of how we think 
about emotional states today. We are uncertain about our powers of 
introspection. We believe in repressed feelings and unconscious drives, and 
therefore believe that it takes of our feelings are repressed and that it therefore 
takes real work to know what they are. All of this was missing in 1857 when 
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A second difference with contemporary accounts of 
science centers on what Hedge calls the voluntary 
operations of the mind. Contemporary theories tend to focus 
on observation and logical reasoning. Hedge, however, 
points out the importance of certain other aspects of 
cognition. These include: 
1. Attention—the ability of the mind to focus on some 
particular aspect of experience;129  
2. Comparison—the mind’s ability to contemplate two 
things with respect to one another;130 
3. Abstraction—the ability to consider one particular 
aspect of a thing while disregarding other aspects;131 
4. Association—the ability of one idea in the mind to 
call forth another;132 
5. Analysis—the ability of the mind to separate out one 
aspect of a compound subject and to focus on that aspect to 
the exclusion of all others.133 
Hedge’s focus on the voluntary operations means that 
his conception of right method is only partially rooted in 
right reasoning. Scientists must also be careful about how 
they utilize their perceptions.  
Modern philosophers of science tend to emphasize the 
formal reasoning process, overlooking the ways in which 
perceptions and feelings are processed by the mind. They 
urge scientists to be accurate in their observations and 
rigorous in their formal reasoning. Hedge, however, 
emphasized that good science requires more. He writes: 
  
Hedge wrote his Logick. For Hedge, feelings were like perceptions—our minds 
reacted to things in the real world both in positive and negative ways. These 
responses were not dismissed as somehow irrational. Rather they appeared to 
be attached to the things that caused them in a way that let us know whether 
these things were to be avoided or pursued. 
 129. Id. at 20-23. 
 130. Id. at 23-25. 
 131. Id. at 25-27. 
 132. Id. at 28-32. 
 133. Id. at 32-34. 
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[I]f there be any thing that can be called genius in matters of mere 
judgment and reasoning, it seems to consist chiefly in being able 
to give that attention to the subject, which keeps it steady in the 
mind, till we can survey it accurately on all sides. . . . the powers 
of judging and reasoning depend chiefly on keeping the mind to a 
clear and steady view of the subject. 134  
Thus, the focus on the voluntary operations of the mind 
helps us to see the difference between raw data and reliable 
observation. It is not enough to be a passive receptor for 
perceptions and feelings. One must also focus one’s 
attention on individual aspects of experience, make 
comparisons, and analyze one’s experiences into their 
component parts.  
These, then, are the two distinctive aspects of Hedge’s 
philosophy of science. They have significant consequences 
for legal science. Modern theorists tend to dismiss the idea 
that we can study law as a natural science.135 The reason for 
this is tied up with the distinction that is commonly made 
between matters of fact and matters of value. Science, we 
presuppose, is an inherently descriptive activity—all of its 
findings are based upon observations of facts in the material 
world. Law, on the other hand, is concerned not only with 
the law as it is, but also with the law as it ought to be. It is 
therefore an inherently normative activity; and, as such, 
remains unrelated to physical observation. This, according 
to current theories, means that the normative aspects of law 
cannot be studied scientifically.136 Hedge, however, did not 
share the assumption that there is a radical division 
between fact and value. By privileging our feelings as well 
as our perceptions, a science of value becomes possible. The 
  
 134. Id. at 20-21 (quoting THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF MAN 
80 (1788)). Thomas Reid (1710-1796) was a Scottish logician whose work was 
very influential with the logicians at Harvard. See FLOWER & MURPHEY, supra 
note 123, at 245-54. 
 135. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 
107-10 (1994). 
 136. Of course, legal positivism is consistent with this kind of scientific 
positivism. Legal positivism reduces law to facts about what legislatures and 
courts do. It is important to see, however, if we treat legal positivism as a 
science, that is, if we try to make predictions on the basis of observing courts 
and legislatures, it is necessary make assumptions about the normative 
commitments of certain actors. In any case, when Langdell called law a science, 
this kind of positivistic science was not what he had in mind. 
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feeling that some result is both fair and just counts as 
evidence that it is so in the same way that the sensation of 
red is evidence of a red object. Of course it is possible that 
something may appear red even though it isn’t. In the same 
way, something may feel fair and just, but still not be so. 
That is why the voluntary operations of the mind are so 
important. In this connection, Hedge writes:  
Without [analysis], our perceptive powers would give us only 
confused and imperfect notions of the objects around us. . . . 
Nature dictates this process. . . . The objects, which nature 
presents to us, consist of assemblages of different qualities, some 
more and others less easily distinguished. . . . Things, which have 
no immediate reference to material objects, such as thoughts, 
affections, and mental operations, are analyzed in the same 
manner, as objects of sense. . . . The same may be said of moral 
qualities, as justice, prudence, benevolence, and the like. 137 
Thus, with both facts and values, it is important to 
think critically about the perceptions and feelings one 
experiences. One can ask: “Is this object really red or am I 
seeing it through a red filter?” Equally, one can ask: “Is this 
outcome really just? Would I feel it to be so if I were the 
plaintiff or the defendant?”  
As a result of Hedge’s influence, Harvard students were 
led to organize their thoughts in a particular way. The raw 
material of any inquiry consisted of the things described as 
intuitive evidence—what we see, hear, and feel. The next 
step involved cleaning up the raw material by subjecting it 
to thorough inspection and analysis. The final step was 
logic. Inferences could be drawn in accordance with a 
number of approved methods. These included deduction, 
induction, analogy, probability theory, and “reasoning from 
facts.”138  
  
 137. HEDGE, supra note 124, at 32-34. 
 138. The last category is particularly interesting to lawyers. It is a description 
of principles that can be used to analyze bits of evidence and testimony in order 
to determine the true fact of the matter. Examples of these principles are: 
 We rely upon the assertions of others. Id. at 108. 
 Written testimony is better than oral testimony. Id. at 114. 
 General notoriety is a ground for belief. Id. at 117. 
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One should note that this is a very loose conception of 
scientific method. There is no canonical form of inquiry. 
Whether the inquiry is descriptive or normative, rational 
inquirers were urged to use whatever techniques suited 
their subject matters. This diversity of method, however, 
does not prevent us from further analyzing the method that 
regulated the formulation of Langdell’s theory. Indeed, 
Hedge makes a number of distinctions that are helpful in 
this process. The first is a distinction between the 
demonstrative method used in mathematics and other less 
formal methods of reasoning.139 In the next section (Part 
III.B), I will use this distinction to consider the common 
claim that Langdell modeled his legal analysis on the 
deductive methods of geometry. A second distinction is 
between an analytic method that aims primarily at 
classification and a synthetic method that adopts an 
explanatory hypothesis to account for observed data. In this 
context, I will address the claim that Langdell’s project is 
primarily one of classification (Part III.C).  
B. Langdell’s Theory as Demonstrative Reasoning 
It is commonly thought that Langdell utilized a logical 
method similar to that used in geometry or mathematics. 
There are a number of reasons why this view is so 
widespread. First, there is Holmes’ review140 of Langdell’s 
  
 Circumstantial evidence is reliable when there is enough so that 
they cannot be accounted for in any way except by supposing the truth 
in question. Id. at 120. 
 Exceptional facts need much testimony. Id. at 123-24. 
 139. Hedge describes two types of reasoning—demonstrative reasoning and 
moral reasoning. He defines the first—“demonstrative reasoning”—as reasoning 
that “is employed about abstract and independent truths, or those relations, 
which are considered as necessary, and whose subjects may be exactly measured 
and defined.” Id. at 84-85. The second—“moral reasoning”—includes all forms of 
correct reasoning that is not demonstrative. Id. at 83-84. It is important to note 
that the term “moral” reasoning is misleading. It is not limited to normative 
reasoning such as practical syllogisms and deontic logic. It includes not only 
these, but also the methods of science—be it the classificatory method of the life 
sciences or the predictive method of the physical sciences. Id. at 85-86. In fact, 
Hedge’s notion of moral reasoning is what we might today refer to as applied 
reasoning, and to avoid confusion, from here on out, I will refer to this second 
type of reasoning as “applied reasoning.”  
 140. Holmes, supra note 114, at 233-34. 
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Summary. The review, in typical Holmes fashion, rings with 
memorable phrases. For example Holmes accuses Langdell 
of being “the greatest living legal theologian,” and sums up 
his disagreement with Langdell with the oft-quoted 
statement: “The life of the law has not been logic; it has 
been experience.”141 These words were fatal for Langdell. 
They lie at the heart of the realist movement that saw 
Holmes as a far-sighted realist and Langdell as an old-
fashioned formalist. This led to a picture of Langdell as one 
who equated law with an internal logic that remained 
unaffected by world events. Notwithstanding the stereotype 
of Langdell as a formalist, there is no quicker way to 
misunderstand his theory than to assume that he is 
engaged in creating a logical system. To illustrate the point, 
we might take a careful look at Hedge’s description of 
demonstrative reasoning.142 Demonstrative reasoning, in 
Hedge’s terms, is a closed deductive system of the kind 
utilized in mathematics.143 It begins with a fixed number of 
  
 141. Id. at 234. 
 142. In talking about the nature of mathematical reasoning, I am using the 
terminology and the description given by Hedge. It should be noted, however 
that there is nothing unusual about Hedge’s account. It more or less mirrors 
what we understand about such studies today. It is also fairly consistent with 
the view of mainstream experts in mathematical logic. 
 143. The distinction between demonstrative reasoning and applied reasoning 
is further described by Hedge by noting six differences between them: the 
following table is constructed from Hedge’s text. See HEDGE, supra note 124, at 
84-89. 
Demonstrative Reasoning Applied Reasoning 
About abstract matters that can 
be precisely measured. 
About matters of fact; things that are 
contingent. 
It leaves the reasoner with a 
definite conclusion. 
May have arguments of weight on both 
sides and therefore the result may be 
regarded as uncertain or tentative. 
The opposite of its conclusion is 
absurd. 
The opposite of its conclusion is 
considered false. 
Its conclusion is certain. Its conclusion is only probable. 
Its conclusion is supported by a 
single thread of argument where 
each step has an intuitive 
connection to what went before.  
Its conclusion may be supported by a 
number of independent arguments 
each one of which adds weight to the 
conclusion. 
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clear and precise axioms which are intuitively obvious to 
all.144 It then proceeds solely by means of deductive 
arguments. It is this combination—incontrovertible 
premises and a deductive method—that gives mathematical 
truths their timeless, universal, and necessary character. If 
one were to apply such a method to law, then each legal 
case: (1) would have one and only one right answer; and (2) 
the answer would be correct for all time and under all 
circumstances. To determine whether Langdell is using 
such a method, we should apply these criteria to what we 
have learned about his theory.  
Langdell’s theory is different from a demonstrative 
argument in a number of ways. First his premises are not 
intuitively obvious. They are, by his own account, derived 
from the cases, and even for someone who has closely read 
the cases there is nothing obvious about them.145 
Furthermore, his theory is built upon more than deductive 
reasoning. One cannot, for example, deduce his conclusion 
—offer and acceptance are required for the formation of a 
contract—from the rule most commonly found in the cases—
one side cannot be bound unless the other side is. In 
addition, even Langdell does not believe that the results of 
his theory are timeless, universal and independent of 
circumstances. If he did believe this, he would not offer so 
much explanation and justification for the results in 
particular cases. Finally, the notion of the Summary as an 
instance of demonstrative reasoning is hard to square with 
Langdell’s own humility about his enterprise. Certainly, if 
he believed that he had succeeded in reducing contract law 
to a logical system, he would not have published it solely as 
a teaching aid for students. Indeed, in explaining why he 
has called the work a summary, he states that “it has at 
  
Chief problem is finding the 
intermediate steps to construct a 
proof. 
Chief problem is the lack of exact 
definitions to our words and the 
difficulty of keeping the factual context 
steadily in view.  
 
 144. Id. at 84-85. 
 145. See Holmes, supra note 108, at 233-34. 
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least the recommendation of not leading the reader to 
expect too much[.]”146 
There is one variation on the theme of Langdell as a 
legal logician that deserves special consideration. Thomas 
Grey, in an article entitled Langdell’s Orthodoxy,147 argues 
that Langdell’s system resembles mathematics only if one 
thinks about mathematics in the empirical terms suggested 
by John Stuart Mill. Mill believed that the truths of 
mathematics were empirical generalizations.148 For 
example, he thought that one knew that 2 + 2 = 4 because 
every time we counted two things and two more things we 
ended up with four. Grey thought that Langdell intended a 
similar process to be undertaken by his students: they 
would read the cases, select the rules, and generalize to a 
collection of rules that formed the basis of contract law.149 
Grey makes the sensible point that if Langdell had been 
committed to deriving his theory from intuitively obvious 
first principles, then students would not have been expected 
to extract the principle from the cases.150 This use of an 
empirical model of mathematics permits Grey to explain 
why it is that the principles had to be gleaned from the 
cases and, at the same time, to argue that Langdell was a 
formalist in all the ways that count, i.e., that he claimed 
universality and certainty for his mathematical 
conclusions.151 Grey’s description, however, hardly matches 
what we have seen of Langdell’s theory and the cases that 
support it. In particular, we have seen that the theory 
contains principles that are not enumerable from those 
articulated in the cases. Arriving at Langdell’s conclusion 
requires more than just observing and counting. As we shall 
see in the next section, the creation of a freestanding theory 
is an essential part of his enterprise. 
  
 146. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at iv. 
 147. Grey, supra note 7, at 19. 
 148. MILL, supra note 119, at 147. 
 149. Grey, supra note 7, at 20. 
 150. Id. 
 151. The empirical model portrays the first principles of mathematics as 
empirical generalizations about the world. The resulting mathematical 
conclusions are relatively certain—they are correct so long as the relatively 
simple observations are done correctly.  
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C. Langdell’s Theory as a Classificatory System 
Hedge makes another distinction that is useful in trying 
to analyze Langdell’s method. This is the distinction 
between analysis and synthesis.152 An analytic method is 
one in which a compound subject is reduced to its 
elementary parts. For example, if I want to analyze the 
concept of a unicorn, I might divide it into (1) a horse like 
creature and (2) the existence of one horn coming from its 
forehead. On the other hand, a synthetic method is one that 
brings certain unlike things together. For example, 
conceiving of both a robin and a blue jay, I can synthesize 
these conceptions into the concept of a bird. This synthesis 
will require a certain amount of analysis. I must analyze 
each concept to find out what they have in common and 
then use this to define the more general concept. For Hedge, 
the important difference between analysis and synthesis is 
their different functions.153 Analysis is essential if we are 
trying to increase our store of knowledge and synthesis is 
useful in conveying knowledge previously achieved. For 
students, synthesis can be an aid to comprehension and 
memory.  
When these methods are applied to observational 
sciences, there are important differences between them. 
With analysis, each observation is broken down into its 
constituent parts. Therefore, each statement that is made 
will be descriptive; that is, each term in such a statement 
will describe some aspect of the observation. For example, I 
see a robin. I note that a distinguishing feature of the robin 
is its red breast. The term “red breast” is descriptive in the 
sense that it refers to a property of the thing that is 
observed. On the other hand, if I am using a synthetic 
method, I might categorize the robin as “something we saw 
on our walk today.” Such a categorization might be useful if 
I am trying to teach my daughter what a robin is. Or, when 
added to the rabbit and the deer that we also saw today, it 
  
 152. This distinction is similar to Kant’s distinction between analytic and 
synthetic judgments. For Kant, an analytic judgment is one that breaks a 
concept down into its constituent parts. For example, all bachelors are 
unmarried. On the other hand, Hedge is using these terms to describe not just 
statements but a method. For example, an analytic method is one that focuses 
on a single conception and lays out its constituent parts.  
 153. HEDGE, supra note 124, at 190-91. 
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might be used to help her learn the concept of “animals that 
are not pets.” The important thing about the synthetic 
method is that, by its very nature, it must introduce 
concepts that are not directly present in the observations 
themselves. This is one reason why we must regard 
Langdell’s work as synthetic in nature.  
The fact that Langdell’s theory is a synthetic theory is 
very important because it helps us to locate the theory 
within the context of mid-nineteenth century theorizing. In 
this context, Howard Schweber’s paper, The “Science” of 
Legal Science: the Model of the Natural Sciences in 
Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education,154 is 
extremely helpful. Schweber distinguishes between the 
group of scientists that were active in the period before the 
Civil War, and a second generation that were active after 
the Civil War. The pre-war group included Alexander 
Bache,155 Benjamin Peirce,156 Louis Agassiz,157 and others.158 
They espoused what Schweber calls “Protestant Baconism,” 
a theory marked by four distinctive characteristics: 
1. A commitment to natural theology; 
2. A taxonomic view of science; 
3. A belief in the unity of science; and 
4. A faith that public science would produce “moral and  
   political uplift.”159 
  
 154. Schweber, supra note 7, at 421. 
 155. Alexander Dallas Bache (1806-1867), Superintendent of the U.S. Coastal 
Survey (1843-1867), great-grandson of Benjamin Franklin. 
 156. Benjamin Peirce (1809-1880), Harvard mathematician and father of 
Charles Peirce. 
 157. Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), Harvard geologist and paleontologist who did 
much to establish Harvard as a world-class university. For more information 
generally about these men, see JOSEPH BRENT, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: A LIFE 
29 (1998); EDWARD LURIE, LOUIS AGASSIZ: A LIFE IN SCIENCE (1960); and HUGH 
RICHARD SLOTTEN, PATRONAGE, PRACTICE, AND THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN 
SCIENCE: ALEXANDER DALLAS BACHE AND THE U.S. COAST SURVEY (1994). 
 158. Schweber mentions Joseph Henry, James Dana, Oliver Gibbs, John 
Frazier, and Benjamin Gould. Schweber, supra note 7, at 425. 
 159. Id. at 423.  
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Agassiz was a good example of “Protestant Baconism” in 
action. Agassiz’s particular gift was his ability to motivate 
ordinary people to become investigators on his behalf. He 
would organize field trips and local clubs to scour the 
countryside for fossils and geological formations. He 
believed that the study of nature was the study of God. 
Since God created life, he reasoned, understanding God 
meant surveying the forms of life that he created. 
Furthermore, he believed that organizing the samples into 
classes, species, and genres would generate an insight into 
the nature of God’s intellect.160  
The second generation identified by Schweber followed 
the Civil War and was typified by botanist Asa Gray whom 
Schweber describes as “presid[ing] over an institutional 
turning inward that emphasized internalist discourse, 
disassociation from public affairs, a rejection of theological 
and political implications alike, and an emphasis on the 
value of theoretical rather than practical scientific 
understanding and on the construction of explanatory 
theories rather than taxonomies.”161 
This second generation was not content to simply 
catalogue their observations. They were motivated by a 
desire to do grand theory. Key to their method was the 
formulation of explanatory hypotheses that not only 
explained past observations but could predict future ones. 
This second generation included men like Charles Peirce, 
William James, Chauncey Wright, and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.162  
The question for Schweber is whether Langdell’s theory 
is an instance of Protestant Baconism or whether it is the 
kind of explanatory theory that represents the method of 
the post-war generation? Schweber argues for the first 
alternative. In doing so, he characterizes Langdell’s theory 
in ways that seem, given the above analysis of Langdell’s 
theory, clearly mistaken. For example, Schweber states that 
Langdell “retained the constrained inductivism” of 
Protestant Baconism because “his students would reason by 
  
 160. LURIE, supra note 157, at 58-62. 
 161. Schweber, supra note 7, at 456. 
 162. It was members of the second generation who founded The Metaphysical 
Club described the book by LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001). 
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inference to already-determined principles, set out in 
summaries.”163 As we have seen, however, the theory 
contained in the Summary is not an inductive 
generalization of the principles already contained in the 
cases. In another place, Schweber argues that “Langdell 
drew his students’ attention only to those few cases that he 
knew to be accurate and clear demonstrations of principles 
known to him to be correct[,]”164 but we have seen that, from 
Langdell’s point of view, many of the cases in the Casebook 
are misleading or incorrect. Langdell may be, in many ways, 
a holdover from the earlier generation, but one thing is 
certain. Langdell’s theory is no mere classification of the 
principles put forward in the cases. 
In Schweber’s defense, there are a number of reasons 
why it seems natural to place Langdell in the earlier 
generation of Protestant Baconists. First, Langdell’s age is 
closer to that generation than to the later one. Second, 
Hedge’s Logick, from which Langdell learned about 
scientific method, was at the heart of Protestant Baconism. 
Finally, Langdell’s “fuddy-duddy” image is hardly consistent 
with his placement at the forefront of methodological 
innovation. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the actual 
theory articulated by Langdell is an instance of the 
predictive methodology utilized by the post-war generation, 
and this should not be a surprise given certain additional 
facts. First, Langdell was not an academic of the old school. 
He had spent years practicing law in New York and only 
returned to Cambridge after the Civil War in 1870.165 This 
was exactly the time when the post-war generation was 
developing its views.166 Secondly, a man who had been 
educated under the influence of Hedge’s Logick knew that, 
while analysis was the method of science, synthesis was the 
method by which science should be taught. Teaching was, of 
course, exactly the enterprise in which Langdell was 
  
 163. Schweber, supra note 7, at 459. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Bruce A. Kimball & R. Blake Brown, “The Highest Legal Ability in the 
Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 1855-1870, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39 (2004). 
 166. The Metaphysical Club started meeting in 1872, and, given that Langdell 
shared rooms with Chauncey Wright, it is certain that he was aware of their 
views. Kimball, supra note 1, at 215-16. 
2010] LANGDELL AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 599 
engaged. The Casebook and the Summary are both the 
product of the following set of circumstances:  
Now, however, I was called upon to consider directly the subject 
of teaching, not theoretically but practically, in connection with a 
large school . . . . To accomplish this successfully, it was necessary, 
first, that the efforts of the pupils should go hand in hand with 
mine, that is, that they should study with direct reference to my 
instruction; secondly, that the study thus required of them should 
be of the kind from which they might reap the greatest and most 
lasting benefit; thirdly, that the instruction should be of such a 
character that the pupils might at least derive a greater 
advantage from attending it than from devoting the same time to 
private study.167 
Langdell was first and foremost a teacher of law. It was 
as a teacher that he proposed his theory. The theory is 
therefore synthetic—it provides a way of understanding the 
cases as well as a way of recommending outcomes for future 
cases. If much about his modes of expression seem old 
fashioned, this one thing was not. Langdell’s theory 
represented a methodological innovation that would become 
the mainstay for legal education for many years to come.  
D. Langdell’s Theory as Predictive Science 
Having argued that Langdell’s theory is synthetic in 
Hedge’s terms, it would be helpful to understand exactly 
what this means. Unfortunately, in this connection, Hedge 
is little help. While Hedge characterizes synthetic theories 
as providing a general explanation, he does not say much 
about the kind of explanation they offer. To understand this 
issue, we need to look not at Hedge, whose book was 
published in 1816, but to a logic book published by Francis 
Bowen in 1864.168 By 1880, when Langdell published his 
Summary, Bowen’s book was in wide use and had 
supplanted Hedge’s as the required logic text at Harvard. 
Just as Hedge’s book had provided guidance for the pre-war 
generation of scientists; it was Bowen who taught the post-
war generation. Under Bowen’s influence, this second 
generation was quickly assimilating the use of explanatory 
  
 167. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at vii. 
 168. BOWEN, supra note 123. 
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hypotheses.169 Since we have seen that Langdell is 
propounding such a theory, it is to Bowen’s book that we 
must look for an explanation of how such theories work.  
Bowen’s text includes a full discussion of synthetic 
theories. In the course of this discussion, he describes three 
ways in which our scientific knowledge becomes more 
general. The three types of generalization are: (1) A General 
Fact, (2) A Law of Nature, and (3) A Physical Cause.170 
Looking at the first two of these will give us a better 
understanding of Langdell’s theory.171  
A General Fact is the result of an induction by simple 
enumeration. Bowen’s examples include: 
All horned animals are ruminant; 
All quadrupeds are viviparous; 
Every living thing is produced from an egg; and 
Alcohol and opium intoxicate.172  
A General Fact asserts a relationship between subject 
and predicate that is true of all observed cases.173  
A Law of Nature is what Bowen describes as a “second 
order induction.”174 It is similar to a General Fact, but it 
  
 169. See, e.g., O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-61 
(1897); infra note 178. 
 170. BOWEN, supra note 123, at 405. 
 171. Bowen’s discussion of the third type of generalization portrays a physical 
cause as something even more general than a Law of Nature, “bearing the same 
relation to a Law of Nature, that such a Law bears to a General Fact.” Id. at 
413. Utilizing Bowen’s distinction between Laws of Nature and Physical Causes 
would lead us far afield into the area of nineteenth-century metaphysics and is 
not necessary to the analysis of Langdell. 
 172. Id. at 405. 
 173. Id. at 413. 
 174. Id. at 406. Bowen uses both terms—Law of Nature and second order 
induction—to describe the use of explanatory hypotheses. In this context, I 
prefer the latter since the term Law of Nature is a little misleading. There are 
obviously differences between what we generally understand to be a law of 
nature and the law as it is practiced by the courts. Bowen’s use of term, 
however, is technical as he uses it to refer solely to those generalizations that 
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asserts that a certain relationship “must hold true on all 
occasions.” This means that it applies not only to all 
observed cases, but also to all similar cases that may be 
observed in the future. Indeed, the presence of even one 
non-conforming case means that the second order induction 
is false. Furthermore, a second order induction has more 
generality than a simple General Fact: 
A Law of Nature [or second order induction], in its more definite 
signification, is employed to designate a group or series of General 
Facts, relating to the same subject or class of subjects, and 
differing from each other by some mode of proportional variation, 
so that the place of every member of the series may be easily 
deduced from one numerical formula.175 
Thus, a second order induction does more than simply 
add up the properties of a group of individuals. We may 
have observed, for example, that a marble always rolls down 
Incline A in four seconds and that it always rolls down 
Incline B in six. Each of these is a general fact because it is 
the result of generalizing over a number of actual 
measurements. A second order induction is more general. It 
might give us a formula for determining how fast an object 
will descend an incline no matter what incline is used. For 
example, in a frictionless world, it would relate the time 
elapsed to the weight of the object and the length and angle 
of the incline. These inductions cannot be discovered by 
mere calculation. As Bowen writes: 
The process of hunting for a Law of Nature [or second order 
induction] amid a group of General Facts is essentially tentative, 
resembling an attempt to find the meaning of a riddle; we try one 
guess after another, and at last stumble upon the right one when 
we least expected it. Success is usually obtained, not by trying to 
extend the survey, or to contemplate the largest possible number 
of cases, but by restricting the field of search to a few well-chosen 
instances, and attempting to find a pattern or construction which 
these few will precisely fit.176 
  
are made not by enumeration but by considering patterns in observed facts. See, 
e.g., id. at 308, 345, 406. 
 175. Id. at 406. 
 176. Id. at 409-10. 
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It is clear that Langdell’s theory should be analogized to 
a second order induction.177 This should not surprise us. By 
1880, it must have been clear that no simple inductive 
theory could bring order to contract law. For example, we 
have seen that Kent acknowledged the need for general 
rules; but, at the same time, was unable to find any.178 We 
have also seen that, as contract law became more complex, 
Parsons was only able to describe it in a lengthy and 
confusing text.179 General facts had simply failed to organize 
the material. Like physics, contract law needed grand 
theory; that is, it needed to invent new concepts that would 
explain individual outcomes.  
The notion that Langdell was propounding something 
like a second order inductive theory is supported by a 
number of striking similarities between Bowen’s text and 
Langdell’s description of the case method. One such 
similarity is apparent when we compare Langdell to 
Blackstone. Blackstone describes contract law by reciting 
certain General Facts. For example, one such fact is: if a 
buyer leaves the seller’s place of business without leaving a 
deposit, the courts will not find an enforceable contract.180 
Langdell, by contrast, is not content with simply 
enumerating such facts. He is looking for something that 
“must hold true on all occasions”:181 “Law, considered as a 
science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have 
such a mastery of these as to be able to aply them with 
  
 177. Bowen’s focus on physical laws leads him to describe second order 
inductions in terms of proportionality and mathematical formulas. Strictly 
speaking, then, Langdell’s theory would not fit into this category. Nevertheless, 
as the text argues, there are enough similarities to make a sound analogy 
between Langdell’s theory and second order induction. Furthermore, Charles 
Peirce whose work in logic succeeded Bowen’s coined the term “Abduction” to 
describe reasoning that posited an explanatory hypothesis from which observed 
facts could be deduced. Langdell’s method would count as abductive and what I 
write here about second order inductions is equally true of abduction. See 
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, Lecture VII: Pragmatism and Abduction, in 5 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 112, 112-14 (Charles Hartshorne 
& Paul Weiss eds., Belknap Press 1965) (1934). 
 178. See supra Part I.B. 
 179. See supra Part I.C. 
 180. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 447. 
 181. BOWEN, supra note 123, at 405. 
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constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of 
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer[.]”182 
We can also see a similarity between Bowen and 
Langdell in their insistence that increased generality is not 
obtained by surveying increasing numbers of individual 
cases. Bowen speaks of the necessity of “restricting the field 
of search to a few well-chosen instances,”183 while Langdell 
instructs: 
This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cases; 
and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering 
the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is 
embodied. But the cases which are useful and necessary for this 
purpose at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion 
to all that have been reported.184 
Finally, there is the fact that Langdell’s theory uses 
terms and concepts that are not contained in the cases 
themselves. We can see from Bowen’s description that this 
is a particular characteristic of second order inductions. We 
can formulate General Facts without changing our 
vocabulary, but a second order induction requires that we 
find something in common between two states of affairs that 
is not contained in a simple empirical report. For example, 
two marbles are subject to the law of gravity even though 
one can examine them closely and never see such a force. 
We obtain such a concept only by creating it to explain 
observed behavior. Similarly, one can look at the pre-
Langdell contracts case law in vain for any hint that there 
is a distinction to be made between an offer and an 
acceptance. It is only Langdell’s creative power that 
supplies such a concept, and the test of this concept is 
whether it in fact predicts future events. 
We can achieve additional clarity about Langdell’s 
method by comparing it to the notion of “abduction” as that 
term is used by Charles Peirce.185 Like second order   
 182. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at viii. 
 183. BOWEN, supra note 123, at 410. 
 184. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at viii. 
 185. Charles Peirce was in fact barely fifteen years younger than Langdell. His 
work in logic, however, was ahead of its time and he had a particular influence 
on later philosophers of science such as Karl Popper, W. V. O. Quine, and Hilary 
Putnam. 
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inductions, an abduction formulates a general hypothesis 
from which the observed facts can be deduced. For example, 
Newton’s laws represent an abductive inference. The laws 
themselves can never be deduced from observed phenomena. 
Rather the laws, if we suppose them to be true, entail 
observed phenomena. In short, predictions about how 
physical objects will behave are deducible from the laws 
themselves. This is why abduction is the “only logical 
operation which introduces any new idea.”186 It can bring in a 
new idea precisely because it is not derived from the 
observations themselves. One can make up an abductive 
conclusion out of whole cloth. Obviously, then, the assertion of 
an abduction does not make it true. It only furnishes a 
suggestion that can be tested by comparison with particular 
cases. Thus, Peirce writes about the justification of abduction 
as follows: 
Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can 
draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we 
are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it 
must be by abduction that this is to be brought about.  
No reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can 
discover; and it needs no reason since it merely offers 
suggestions.187  
Note that Langdell’s theory meets all of the 
requirements for an abductive theory. It formulates a 
general theory; it adds new terms to the analysis; and it is 
tested by comparison to predictions about future legal cases.  
This description of abduction and of synthetic theories 
generally leaves us with a clear direction as to where we 
should look for justification of Langdell’s theory. We can 
view Langdell’s theory as correct so long as the results that 
it entails for individual cases match the real world results of 
those cases. However, with law, the question of prediction is 
a peculiar one. Does it mean predicting what the court will 
do or what it should do? If the latter, how can such a 
normative hypothesis be justified? These are questions that 
will be addressed in the next section.  
  
 186. CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, Lecture VI: Three Types of Reasoning, in 5 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, supra note 177, at 94, 106.  
 187. Id. 
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 Conclusion and Summary to Part III 
Langdell’s innovation comes down to this: to do legal 
science, it is not enough to organize, compile, and classify 
legal authority; it is also necessary to theorize. Legal 
theories are made in the same way that theories are made 
in empirical science.  
In empirical science, the scientist formulates a theory 
that explains the observed facts. The explanation may use 
abstract terms and concepts, such as “force” or 
“temperature,” which are not immediately present in the 
observed phenomena. An empirical theory explains the 
observed data if the observed data is deducible from the 
theory itself. So long as the theory accurately predicts 
observed phenomena, the scientist is justified in believing 
the theory to be true and using it as the basis for further 
experiments.  
In legal science, likewise, the theorist formulates a 
theory that explains the existing legal cases. Again, the 
theory may use abstract terms and concepts that are not 
used in the cases themselves. A legal theory explains the 
cases if: (1) it entails a non-ambiguous result for each of the 
legal questions it covers; and (2) the result that it mandates 
in each individual case is the right result. In law, the 
determination of a “right” result presents particular 
problems of justification, and these will be considered in the 
next part.  
IV. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION  
In the last part, I argued that Langdell’s theory is 
predictive in the sense that it provides a general 
explanation of contract law from which specific results in 
individual cases can be derived. I have also argued that the 
idea of a predictive doctrinal theory for contract law is 
original with Langdell. In this part, I turn to the question of 
justification. The discussion has two parts. First, there is 
the question of how Langdell thought about justification. 
Why did he think that his theory was correct? How would 
he know whether he had hit upon the right explanation for 
the development of contract law? I will address these 
questions in Part IV.A. The second section (IV.B) addresses 
more contemporary concerns. What is the nature of a 
doctrinal theory, and what, for us, justifies its use? It is 
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important to ask this second question because Langdell 
wrote over a century ago; and, in that time, our ideas about 
scientific method and the nature of justification have 
changed.  
A. Justifying Langdell’s Theory  
I concluded in the last part that Langdell’s goal was to 
formulate a synthetic and predictive theory. It follows that 
the question of justification is entirely a matter of the 
accuracy of its predictions. At this point, one is tempted to 
throw up one’s hands and say that Langdell’s theory is 
false. After all, we have seen that it is at variance with the 
outcomes of a number of cases.188 This would be fatal indeed 
if the point of the theory were to predict the actual outcome 
of legal cases. However, I do not think that this was 
Langdell’s purpose. To show this, we would do well to 
contrast Langdell’s predictive theory with the predictive 
theory that was advocated by Holmes in The Path of the 
Law.189 Holmes argues that the point of learning law is to 
predict what courts will do in fact,190 and I think it is 
obvious to anyone who thinks about it, that such predictions 
could not be made solely on the basis of doctrinal 
arguments. Even a first year law student knows that courts 
do not always follow the most recent formulations of legal 
doctrine. Courts sometimes change the law, or 
misunderstand the law, or apply some different part of the 
law, or find an exception to the law, or simply ignore the 
law because it does not make sense in a particular case. A 
Holmesian prediction must take account of all these 
possibilities. A Langdellian prediction, on the other hand, 
will be something simpler. It cannot, however, be too 
simple. For example, it would be question-begging to say, 
that Langdellian legal doctrine simply predicts what legal 
doctrine will recommend for the decision of a case. Instead, I 
think that Langdell is offering a genuine jurisprudential 
theory. It is the point of his theory, I believe, to predict what 
would be the right answer for each case that the theory 
covers.  
  
 188. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 18-22.  
 189. Holmes, supra note 169. 
 190. Id. at 457. (“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of 
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”).  
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This raises the question: how can we determine whether 
the result Langdell predicts is really the right result for the 
individual case? To answer this, we must return to the 
epistemological analysis offered by Hedge. Hedge, it will be 
recalled, believed that we have intuitions about morality 
and justice just as we have intuitions about physical 
reality.191 We feel that some particular thing is good or just 
in the same way that we see that a particular physical 
object is red or round. This is why it is so necessary for law 
students to study legal cases. In learning the law, students 
should not be content to simply know what the court did in 
a particular case. They also need to discern whether the 
case was correctly decided. To do this, they consult not just 
the doctrine but their own feelings of justice. This enables 
them  to infer the legal rule—a rule that is not based on 
what the court did but about their own intuitions of what 
the court should have done in that particular case. 
Note that the basis of the above described process is 
that a student can, as Hedge asserts, determine what the 
outcome should be for a particular case. This permits the 
student both to make the appropriate inferences and, once 
the explanatory hypothesis is obtained, to compare its 
predictions with the individual cases. If the prediction 
matches the preferred outcome, then the theory is 
confirmed. If not, the theory must be abandoned or changed. 
This is why the issue about the mailbox rule is so important 
to Langdell. On the one hand, Langdell asserts that is 
irrelevant if the mailbox rule serves justice and convenience 
of the parties. That means that if his theory is correct, then 
arguments about justice and convenience are irrelevant. If, 
on the other hand, one wonders whether the theory is 
correct—i.e. whether it has predicted the correct result in 
the mailbox case—then justice and convenience—or at least 
our feelings about justice are the name of the game. He is 
therefore particularly concerned to show that the 
arguments in support of the mailbox rule are erroneous. He 
argues: 
The only cases of real hardship are where there is a miscarriage of 
the letter of acceptance, and in those cases a hardship to one of 
the parties is inevitable. Adopting one view, the hardship consists 
in making one liable on a contract which he is ignorant of having 
  
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.  
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made; adopting the other view, it consists in depriving one of the 
benefit of a contract he supposes he has made. Between these two 
evils the choice would seem to be clear: the former is positive, the 
latter merely negative; the former imposes a liability to which no 
limit can be placed, the latter leaves everything in statu quo.192 
This defense of his position raises two questions. First, 
what is the relationship between the arguments that 
Langdell gives in this case and the “feelings” of justice upon 
which the decision of the issue must rest. The second 
question relates to jurisprudence. We have paired two 
things—the outcome predicted by the theory and what is 
felt to be the just outcome. If these two things are always 
the same (as they must be if Langdell’s theory is correct) 
then why do we need the theory? Why shouldn’t everyone—
student, lawyer, and judge—simply assume that each case 
must be decided in terms of what is felt to be just? This is a 
good question and a serious one for Langdell’s theory.193 
We can begin to answer these questions by paying 
careful attention to the arguments that he makes about the 
mailbox case. In his mind, the question is not simply 
whether it is or is not just for the plaintiff to win. Rather, he 
begins by looking at the matter from the viewpoint of each 
of the parties.194 This ensures that he does not reach a result 
that is blind to the interests of either. Having done this, he 
argues that either ruling will defeat the rightful 
expectations of one of the parties. This argument essentially 
places both parties on a par in terms of potential injury. 
Which party, he asks, will be more unjustly harmed by an 
  
 192. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 21. 
 193. It is worth noting that this is a problem for any normative jurisprudential 
theory. On the one hand, we cannot verify a normatively predictive theory 
unless we have some way of determining the correct decision in the individual 
case. Since we cannot simply appeal to our original theory, we will need a 
method—call it method #2—to decide the question. On the other hand, if 
method #2 is available to decide the case, why don’t we simply use it instead of 
the jurisprudential theory? The only way in the normative theory could be of 
any use is if it were somehow simpler than method #2. As I argue in the text, 
this objection can only be resolved if we recognize that such theories have a 
dialectical element.  
 194. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 21 (“Adopting one view, the 
hardship consists in making one liable on a contract which he is ignorant of 
having made; adopting the other view, it consists in depriving one of the benefit 
of a contract he supposes he has made.”).  
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unfavorable outcome? This, he weighs, by characterizing a 
failure to enforce the contract as the “status quo” and an 
enforcement of the contract as “impos[ing] a liability to 
which no limit can be placed.”195 Essentially, this argument 
reframes the situation that obtains between the parties.196 
Thus what was once a question of two innocent parties 
being disadvantaged by the vagaries of the mail service 
becomes a choice between maintaining the status quo and 
imposing unlimited liability on one of the parties. By 
reframing the issue, Langdell hopes to succeed in swaying 
the reader’s feelings in a way that favors the defendant.  
This argument demonstrates an important point about 
our feelings of justice. These feelings are not static. We may 
have, as Hedge argues, an innate sense of justice which 
leads us to regard some outcomes with approval and others 
with disapproval.197 Our feelings, however, are shaped not 
only by our perception of the situation, but also by the way 
in which we characterize and interpret it. We may 
empathize with one of the parties. We may have 
background assumptions that provide a context. We may 
see the situation in terms of one normative principle or 
another to which we have a preexisting commitment. 
Langdell’s argument works on this principle. By 
  
 195. Id. (“Between these two evils the choice would seem to be clear: the 
former is positive, the latter merely negative; the former imposes a liability to 
which no limit can be placed, the latter leaves everything in statu quo.”).  
 196. I argue that Langdell is reframing the issue. An alternative 
interpretation is that he offering an independent abstract argument favoring 
the plaintiff. If this is true, it is hard to know what to make of his argument. 
Either it is a utilitarian argument based on the idea that it is less onerous to 
leave the status quo in place or he is simply asserting a normative principle that 
changes in the status quo are always less just than preserving the status quo. If 
it is a utilitarian argument, he has the problem—one that is shared by all rule 
utilitarians—that, by assuming that his rule is less onerous in general, he paves 
the way for particular outcomes that are, in fact, more onerous. (One example 
would be where a starving buyer loses his opportunity to buy the last morsel of 
food, while the rich seller gains a small increment on price by selling to a third 
party). Thus, it could happen, as an empirical matter, that enforcing the rule 
leads to less utility in the long run. On the other hand, the normative principle 
interpretation is even more troublesome. Is there something about the status 
quo that makes it more fair and just than changes in the status quo? Is it 
obvious to all that Robin Hood was behaving unjustly in stealing from the rich 
and giving to the poor?  
 197. See supra note 126-27 and accompanying text. 
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reformulating the situation, he hopes to evoke a particular 
emotional response. Langdell’s contract theory does 
precisely this. It provides a manner of interpreting the 
situation that channels a normative response. This way of 
understanding Langdell’s argument answers the first 
question—what is the relationship between his argument 
and feelings about justice? It also makes a start on the 
second—why isn’t jurisprudence simply a matter of 
consulting one’s feelings about the justice of a case? 
Once we recognize that one’s feelings about the justice 
of a given case are not static, we can see that a 
jurisprudence based upon such feelings must be highly 
ambiguous. Should the judge simply decide in accordance 
with his or her first feelings about a case? Or should there 
be some process by which these feelings are allowed to 
develop? Obviously this is a complicated question and one 
that I will not answer in this Article. I offer, however, a 
partial answer that makes sense in the context of Langdell’s 
theory. It appears to me that a doctrinal theory such as 
Langdell’s does not work by providing more rules or more 
specific rules. Rather it works by providing a context within 
which the rules operate. Mutuality may be the age old 
principle of contract law, but it is not until Langdell applies 
this rule to a more richly described analysis of contract 
formation that the rule becomes more determinate. The 
point of such a doctrinal theory is to force all those who read 
the case to characterize the facts in the same way. This is 
turn produces a higher degree of consensus about the 
desired outcome. Thus there is a distinction to be made 
between feelings of justice that are prompted by a “raw” 
description of a case and those that are prompted when the 
case is described in doctrinal terms. If we assume that 
Langdell is interested in the second possibility, then the 
point of his theory is to provide a canonical way of 
characterizing the facts. Keeping this in mind, we can be 
specific about the kind of confirmation that Langdell’s 
theory requires. What is required is that the theory give a 
definite answer to each legal case that it addresses and that 
the answer it gives, described in doctrinal terms, does not 
provoke feelings of disapproval and injustice. There is 
circularity about this justification, but it is a circularity that 
is shared by all scientific theories—one needs the theory in 
order to measure the confirming instances of the theory. It 
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is this circularity that has led modern philosophers of 
science to think in more pragmatic terms,198 and so in the 
next section, I will consider the problem of doctrinal 
theories in this more modern context.  
B. The Value of Legal Doctrine 
In this section we leave Langdell behind and address 
the question of doctrine from a more modern perspective. I 
said in the beginning that my interest in Langdell was 
caused in part by my recognition that doctrine was an 
important part of legal analysis. Seeing Langdell as the 
inventor of legal doctrine piqued my interest in having a 
better understanding of his work. The time has now come to 
see whether our examination of his theory has helped us to 
a better understanding of legal doctrine. Doctrinal theories 
can take many forms. They can be formulated over a period 
of decades rather than originated by a single person. I am, 
however, interested in one type of theory in particular. 
Therefore in the first subsection (IV.B.1), I will take 
Langdell’s theory as a sample and describe the kind of 
theory in which I am interested. Then, in the second 
subsection (IV.B.2), I will address the question of how such 
a theory should be evaluated, asking what are the 
characteristics of a good doctrinal theory? What do good 
doctrinal theories add to the legal enterprise? 
1. The Nature of Doctrinal Theories. We generally think 
of legal doctrine as a collection of rules that synthesize 
judicial decisions in a given area. The discussion of Langdell 
indicates, however, that it is wrong to think of doctrine 
primarily in terms of rules. One does not create doctrine by 
inventing new rules or by making old rules more specific. 
Rather, the point of doctrine is to provide a context within 
which existing rules will operate more smoothly and 
determinately. It does this by making an abductive 
inference. Langdell formulates a hypothesis about contract 
formation and then the question becomes whether it will 
form the basis for correct inferences about case outcomes. 
Thus, he redescribes the making of a contract by 
  
 198. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(1962); HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981); W.V. Quine, Main 
Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 
(1951). 
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introducing two new technical terms—offer and acceptance. 
This makes it easier to apply the principle of mutuality 
because the analytical framework that Langdell has 
supplied allows us to separate out two issues: 
Contract Formation—which requires an offer and 
acceptance but not mutuality; and  
The Requirement of Consideration—which enforces 
the mutuality principle.  
The result is that the principle of mutuality which has 
been the touchstone for one hundred years of contract law, 
receives a new formulation—one that is more precise and 
more determinate. 
With this understanding of Langdell’s theory, we can be 
more specific about a particularly important form of 
doctrinal theory. I will call this an abductive theory after 
the mode of reasoning it employs. There are, I think, two 
main points to be made about this kind of theory. The first 
is that the aim of the theory is to make existing legal 
doctrine more determinate. The way in which it 
accomplishes this is by providing a descriptive hypothesis 
that will entail a particular result for those cases that it 
covers. The second is that the theory is primarily 
descriptive. It does not include new legal rules except to the 
extent that existing legal principles are modified in order to 
be described within the new legal context. If we take, for 
example, one of Langdell’s rules—a binding contract 
requires both an offer and an acceptance—we can see that 
this is not a new normative proposal. Instead, it simply 
restates the traditional rule—contracts require mutual 
promises—in the context of the new theory.  
With this description in mind, we can understand why 
Langdell’s theory is so often mistaken for a deductive logical 
system.199 A deductive system begins with axioms that may 
or may not be true in the real world. A statement will then 
  
 199. I am avoiding the customary reference to geometry because the notion of 
geometry is ambiguous. On the one hand, Euclidean geometry uses axioms that 
describe the real world and therefore its theorems do so as well. On the other 
hand, there are alternative geometries whose axioms may not accurately reflect 
our intuitions about space.  
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be considered “true in the system” if it meets one of two 
alternate requirements:  
1. It is itself an axiom in the system; or  
2. It is deducible from an axiom in the system.  
This technique shares two characteristics with an 
abductive theory such as Langdell’s. First, the theory 
receives much of its content from the precise definition of 
terms; and, second, there is a deductive relationship 
between the general statements of the theory and its 
description of particular phenomena. Note, however, that 
these two properties are also shared by Newtonian Physics 
and other empirical theories, which are also based on 
abductive reasoning.200 There is, however, an important 
difference between deductive systems and abductive 
theories. Deductive theories can specify that something is 
true only within its own logical system. Abductive theories, 
on the other hand, tell us something about the real world. 
They are, in short, accountable for their consequences. In 
the case of an empirical theory, it must be discarded if it 
predicts false consequences. In the case of a doctrinal 
theory, it must be rejected if it provides legal outcomes that 
are unacceptable to our intuitions of justice and fairness.  
I am obviously using the term “doctrinal theory” in a 
somewhat specialized sense, and it might therefore be 
helpful to give some examples. One that springs to mind is 
the Learned Hand formula which redescribes negligence 
liability in terms of the relative costs of precaution and 
risk.201 The Learned Hand formula is based on the following 
hypothesis: the reasonable person will take precautions 
whenever they cost less than the amount of harm caused by 
the accident discounted by the probability of its 
occurrence.202 The concept of a reasonable person has been 
the touchstone of negligence liability for over a century; 
  
 200. The point of an empirical theory is to provide a general description of 
phenomena in terms that are not immediately observable in the phenomena 
themselves. This often requires a new vocabulary that is precisely defined. The 
test of an empirical theory is that it predicts events in the real world, unlike 
doctrinal theories that entail normative prescriptions of case outcomes.  
 201. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 202. Id. 
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and, by redescribing this concept, Hand’s formula makes it 
more determinate. Indeed, if we assume that burdens, 
probabilities, and harms could be precisely calculated, the 
Learned Hand formula would yield a determinate result in 
every case. This possibility, however, is more theoretical 
than real. The test is useful in some cases, but not all.203 
Where it is useful, however, it is very useful—it gives the 
jury a way to think about the negligence determination.  
2. Evaluating Doctrinal Theories. The question of 
evaluation is crucial for abductive, doctrinal theories. Such 
theories do not rest on the judicial authority of courts. 
Rather they become important only because people opt to 
use them. Obviously, this includes the courts. Indeed a 
doctrinal theory that is taken up by the courts becomes law 
itself. In addition, as Langdell’s experience demonstrates, a 
doctrinal theory has a heuristic function that can be used 
for teaching, even if the theory has not previously been 
utilized by the courts. In thinking about law, each of us 
decides how much reliance we will place upon available 
theories, and therefore it is important to have an answer to 
the question: What makes a good doctrinal theory? Under 
what circumstances, is one justified in using the theory to 
structure one’s own knowledge of law?  
The first requirement for a doctrinal theory is already 
obvious from the discussion in the last section. A doctrinal 
theory should not do violence to our intuitions about the 
right results in individual cases. Accepting a doctrinal 
theory that produces a radical change in our patterns of 
legal decision making is the worst kind of formalism. It 
substitutes logical elegance for the legitimate concerns of 
the legal system and those who enter it seeking justice. No 
matter how persuasive a theory may be, the theory by itself 
is a poor reason for radical change. Furthermore, a teacher 
who uses such a theory will surely confuse students and 
give them an unrealistic understanding of the law. 
Therefore, at the very least, a doctrinal theory should 
comport with our intuitions about the decision of cases.  
  
 203. For example, in those cases where the defendant has had a lapse of 
attention, it is difficult to estimate the cost of insuring that such lapses do not 
occur. One could have, for example, a back-up system but, in most cases, that 
would be too costly. On the other hand, if the precaution is simply that the 
defendant should pay attention, this does not seem to be best analyzed in terms 
of the cost of being attentive.  
2010] LANGDELL AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 615 
In thinking about the requirements for a doctrinal 
theory, it is useful to have an example. In torts, there has 
been a controversy over the rules that define the 
responsibility of land owners and occupiers to those who 
entered on their property. The common law created three 
categories with three separate levels of care as follows:204 
 Definition Duty of Care 
Trespassers 
One who enters the 
land without a 
privilege to do so 
No duty with a 
few exceptions 
Invitees One who enters with permission 
Duty to repair or 
warn of known 
dangers 
Licensees 
One who enters to do 
business with the 
owner 
Duty to inspect 
 
This doctrine was meant to capture our intuitions about 
responsibility in obvious ways. As time went on, the 
doctrine became less and less reliable. The relationships 
between a landowner and those who entered the land 
became more complex and, at the same time, more subject 
to variations. Furthermore, a rule that had permitted little 
or no concern for trespassers had become riddled with 
exceptions, as courts sorted through the vagaries of the 
trespass situation. As a result, the Supreme Court of 
California abolished the doctrine205 and several other states 
  
 204. For a fuller explanation of these categories and the corresponding levels 
of responsibility, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329-43 (1965). 
 205. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing the 
distinctions between trespassers, invitees, and licensees.)  
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followed.206 The California court explained its action by 
writing the following: 
[I]t is apparent that the classifications of trespasser, licensee, 
and invitee, the immunities from liability predicated upon 
those classifications, and the exceptions to those immunities, 
often do not reflect the major factors which should determine 
whether immunity should be conferred upon the possessor of 
land. Some of those factors, including the closeness of the 
connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, the 
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of 
insurance, bear little, if any, relationship to the classifications 
of trespasser, licensee and invitee and the existing rules 
conferring immunity.207 
The result is that, in California and in many other 
states, the liability of a landowner is treated according to 
general negligence principles with special consideration 
paid to the above factors. Not every state, however, has 
joined California in this regard. Some states have retained 
the three way distinction for two main reasons. First, these 
states value the predictability and certainty that attaches to 
the common law rule; and, second, they are generally more 
conservative in defining the responsibility to trespassers 
and invitees.  
This controversy, like the one Langdell faced, presents a 
particular problem. It is necessary for courts to strike a 
balance between justice in the individual case and the need 
to formulate the law in transparent and predictable ways. 
This balance cannot be fully achieved by rules alone. On the 
one hand, some courts have retained the traditional rules. 
They end up denying recovery in meritorious cases or 
inventing exceptions and sub-rules that avoid that result. 
Either way, it is a losing strategy. If they adopt the first, the 
law loses legitimacy because of its apparent unfairness. If 
they adopt the second, the rules become so riddled with 
exceptions that they lose their predictive function, 
undermining the rule of law. On the other hand, courts that 
abolished the common law distinctions had a different 
  
 206. See, e.g., Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1996); Mounsey 
v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973). 
 207. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567. 
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problem. They were free to decide cases in intuitively 
appropriate ways, but, at the same time, lost the 
advantages of a predictable and clear legal rule. Thus, with 
respect to this issue, courts are at an impasse. Neither the 
addition of sub-rules nor the elimination of rigid categories 
is an adequate strategy in the face of a situation where the 
real world is far more complex than the legal analysis that 
purports to describe it. It would take an abductive doctrinal 
theory such as Langdell’s to resolve this impasse. What is 
needed is a redescription of the area that mirrors the 
complexity of real world variations, and can serve as a 
context for the application of reformulated rules.  
Understanding this function of doctrinal theories is 
important to articulating criteria for their evaluation. As a 
pragmatist, I believe that issues of evaluation and 
justification must relate to the usefulness of a theory and 
that this, in turn, requires us to be clear about our goals. I 
have suggested that the goal of doctrinal theories should be 
to improve legal decision making by formulating a more 
complex analysis of legal phenomena. If I am right, then a 
theory’s usefulness in this regard is an important criterion 
for evaluating it.  
CONCLUSION 
The above description of Langdell’s work makes it 
apparent that he made at least two contributions to 
American law besides his well known contributions to legal 
education. The first is that he articulated a doctrinal theory 
of contract law that accounted for the difficulties of 
contracting at a distance. Secondly, and more importantly, 
he provided a model for doctrinal theories. By studying this 
model, I believe we have shed some light on the notion of 
legal doctrine. Legal doctrines do not fulfill their 
synthesizing function simply by conjoining pre-existing 
legal rules. Nor do they invent legal rules. Rather, they 
redescribe a particular legal area in order to provide a 
clearer context in which legal rules can operate. As a result, 
there are two requirements for determining the value of a 
doctrinal theory. The first is its ability to mirror intuitions 
about the just resolution of legal cases. The second is its 
ability to provide simplicity and clarity to a particular area 
of law. Specifically, does it describe the landscape in such a 
way that the use of a few rules will result in relatively 
determinate outcomes. When these tests are applied, we can 
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see that Langdell’s doctrine was a success because it met 
these requirements.  
There is also the larger question: what have we learned 
about our own doctrinal theorizing? There is no doubt but 
what this kind of analysis is a regular part of our legal 
routine. Sometimes we make a list of rules; sometimes we 
look for cases whose facts are like our own. Inevitably, 
however, we do more. We try to construct a richer story that 
will identify the details that justify a particular legal 
treatment. We do this not because it is the only thing we 
could do; nor because it is the thing that lawyers have 
always done. We do it because, beginning with Langdell, 
this is how lawyers are taught to think. With the 
complexities of modern life, it is unlikely that we will ever 
come up with a theory that is a neat and tidy as Langdell’s; 
but, by our training and by the nature of things, we will 
always be partial theorizers. This is the reality, but it is a 
reality in search of a justification. We have seen that, in 
Langdell’s case, the attempt to justify his theory encounters 
some difficulties. Even so, the practice of doctrinal 
theorizing has a certain amount of pragmatic efficiency. It 
organizes cases in such a way that they form a more 
coherent whole; and such coherence aids understanding and 
communication. On the other hand, we should be careful not 
to claim too much. A compelling doctrinal justification may 
seem like it should be binding on all, but ultimately it must 
stand or fall on the willingness of lawyers and especially 
courts to accommodate its use. 
